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In recent years, there have been a number of notable judicial decisions'
and articles' discussing the legal rights of gay and lesbian parents involved in
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond Law School. B.A. Amherst College, 1966;
M.A. Stanford University, 1967; J.D. University of California, Hastings College of Law.
** Associate, Morano, Colan & Butler, Richmond, Virginia. B.S. University of Alabama,
1992; J.D. University of Richmond Law School, 1995.
' See, e.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985) (father brought suit to regain
custody of child from lesbian mother); Birdsall v. Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) (holding order prohibiting homosexual father from keeping son overnight in the presence
of another homosexual unreasonable); Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980)
(denying claim that mother's homosexuality would adversely affect her children); but see
Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981) (granting custody to father rather than
homosexual mother); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982) (granting custody to father
because of mother's homosexuality); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985) (holding father's
homosexual conduct made him unfit and improper father).
2 See, e.g., Robert A. Beargie, Custody Determinations Involving the Homosexual
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child custody disputes. No other case, however, has attracted so much
national and international attention3 as the recent Virginia child custody case
of Bottoms v. Bottoms.4
In one of the most widely publicized child custody disputes in American
Parent, 22 FAM. L.Q. 71 (1988) [hereinafter Beargie]; David K. Flaks, Gay and Lesbian
Families: Judicial Assumptions, Scientific Realities, 3 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 345
(1994) [hereinafter Flaks]; Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional
Families, 78 GEO. L. J. 459 (1990) [hereinafter Polikoffi; Donald H. Stone, The Moral
Dilemma: Child Custody When One Parent is Homosexual or Lesbian, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
711 (1989) [hereinafter Stone]; Patricia J. Falk, Lesbian Mothers: Psychosocial Assumptions
in Family Law, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 941 (1989) [hereinafter Falk]; Gregory M. Herek, Myths
About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY
133 (1991) [hereinafter Herek]; Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents,
63 CHILD DEV. 1025 (1992) [hereinafter Patterson]; Steve Susoeff, Comment, Assessing
Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody
Standard, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 852 (1985). See also infra note 120.
3 In addition to national media attention in the United States, the foreign press also
discussed the Bottoms case ranging from the Ottawa Citizen and Calgary Herald in Canada to
the Agence France Presse in Europe. All the major American television network news
programs fully aired the Bottoms case and it was a subject on numerous morning talk shows.
The Bottoms controversy was further portrayed in a made-for-television movie on the ABC
television network on September 22, 1996. See generally infra notes 85-97 and accompanying
text.
The Bottoms case also was discussed in the American Bar Association Journal. See
Lesbian Loses Custody, Dec., 1993 A.B.A. J. 24; Lesbian Wins Custody Appeal, Sept., 1994
A.B.A. J. 24; Lesbianism at Center of Custody Dispute, July, 1995 A.B.A. J. 28.
4 No. CH 93JA0517-00 (Henrico Co., Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 7, 1993), rev'd and remanded,
Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (3-0 decision), rev'd, Bottoms v.
Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995) (4-3 decision).
When the history of gay and lesbian civil rights in the United States comes to be
written, a chapter will surely be devoted to the case of Sharon Lynne Bottoms. In the
summer of 1993, . . . this young Virginia mother, who never wanted to be
famous-least of all for her love of another woman-became a national and
international celebrity almost literally overnight. Millions of people now know her
name and her situation: she lost custody of her two-year-old child to her mother in
court solely because she wanted a family that did not fit the norm.
Stephen B. Pershing, Entreat Me Not to Leave Thee: Bottoms v. Bottoms and the Custody
Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 3 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 289, 289 (1994)
[hereinafter Pershing]. Mr. Pershing's article discusses and analyzes the applicable law, facts,
and empirical studies surrounding the trial court decision in the Bottoms case. Mr. Pershing is
the Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, and served as co-counsel
representing Sharon Bottoms.
(Vol. 34
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history, Sharon Lynne Bottoms was divested of the custody of her two-year-
old son, Tyler. The custody battle, however, was not between Tyler's mother
and father.' Rather, this particular custody dispute was precipitated by a
petition filed by Tyler's maternal grandmother, Pamela Kay Bottoms, who
claimed that her daughter Sharon, Tyler's mother, was not fit to raise Tyler.
While a mother-daughter child custody battle is somewhat unusual, it is not
the kind of event that normally attracts a great deal of public attention from
anyone outside the immediate family and friends. But the fact that Tyler's
grandmother alleged Tyler's mother was unfit solely because of her
relationship with her lesbian lover was enough to attract the attention of the
local media, and with the aid of national wire services and other related media
sources, Tyler's story quickly spread throughout the United States and into
Canada and Europe.6
The Bottoms child custody dispute, now a high profile case, quickly
became the major focus for a number of national interest groups, ranging from
the activist National Center for Lesbian Rights to the conservative Family
Foundation. The American Civil Liberties Union offered to represent Sharon
Bottoms in her appeal for custody of Tyler, and Stephen B. Pershing' of the
Virginia ACLU served as Sharon's co-counsel. Donald K. Butler, Chair of the
Family Law Section of the Virginia Trial Lawyers Association, agreed to
work with the ACLU on a pro bono basis as a "cooperating attorney."8
Richard R. Ryder of Richmond, Virginia represented Tyler's grandmother,
Pamela Kay Bottoms.
Numerous organizations filed amicus curiae appellate briefs on Sharon
Bottoms' behalf, including the American Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry, the American Psychological Association, and the National
Association of Social Workers and its Virginia Chapter.' The American
' Tyler's father, Dennis D. Doustou, divorced Sharon when Tyler was an infant. Sharon
was awarded sole custody of Tyler, and since their divorce Doustou has provided little, if any,
emotional or financial support to Tyler.
6 See generally infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
See Pershing, supra note 4.
Player B. Michelson of the law firm of Morano, Colan & Butler also served as co-
counsel for Sharon Bottoms in this case.
9 See infra notes 119-131, 213-215 and accompanying text.
1995-961
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Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers also filed an appellate brief in support of
Sharon Bottoms,'" and a consolidated amicus brief was filed on behalf of the
National Center for Lesbian Rights, Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, National Lesbian and Gay
Law Association, Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom, National
Organization for Women's Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Women's
Law Project, and the Northwest Women's Law Center." The Virginia Women
Attorneys Association later filed an additional amicus brief in the Supreme
Court of Virginia in support of Sharon Bottoms by the Virginia Women
Attorneys Association."'
It was not until the Virginia Court of Appeals issued its well-reasoned and
well-documented decision of June 21, 1994, shortly before Tyler's third
birthday - a ruling that subsequently was reversed by the Virginia Supreme
Court - that the focus of the Bottoms case was properly redirected back to its
most significant and important subject: the best interests of young Tyler
Doustou.
This Article traces and analyzes the series of legal and factual events
leading up to the Virginia Supreme Court's contradictory and controversial
decision in Bottoms v. Bottoms.
II. CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES INVOLVING GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS:
A NATIONAL OVERVIEW
The generally prevailing standard in American child custody
adjudications is the best interests of the child,' 3 and the sexual conduct or
sexual orientation of a custodial parent has long been recognized as one
important factor in determining the child's best interests in any parent-child
relationship. 4 But as Professor Homer Clark aptly observes, this is a very
,0 See infra notes 132-144, 216 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 145-156, 217-220 and accompanying text. On appeal to the Virginia
Supreme Court, this amicus curiae brief was joined by the People for the American Way,
Virginians for Justice, North Carolina Gay & Lesbian Law Association, and the Louisiana
Electorate of Gays and Lesbians, Inc.
1 See infra notes 221-224 and accompanying text.
, See generally HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 797-814 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter CLARK]; and JOHN D. GREGORY ET AL.,
UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 371387 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter GREGORY].
14 See CLARK, supra note 13, at 802-06; GREGORY, supra note 13, at 377-380.
[Vol. 34
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difficult area of child custody law to adjudicate:
Parental conduct raising questions of sexual morality has produced more
custody litigation than any other types of conduct. This is particularly true
in some states where the courts have had great trouble in arriving at ways of
talking about the issue which take account of contemporary changes in moral
standards without at the same time abandoning all moral standards entirely.
Notwithstanding contemporary changes in sexual mores, sexual morality still
generates strong emotions in the minds ofjudges which are reflected in their
judgments either expressly or under the surface. 5
Moreover, a number of courts have treated parental heterosexual conduct
and parental homosexual conduct very differently. For example, although
most courts treat heterosexual adultery or heterosexual nonmarital
cohabitation as not constituting parental unfitness per se,'6 this is not always
the same judicial approach with regard to homosexual cohabitation or
conduct. As Professor John DeWitt Gregory observes:
The conduct of a parent that will most often affect custody is sexual
conduct, sometimes disguised by references to "lifestyle." Courts generally
will consider a parent's heterosexual conduct outside of marriage or
homosexual conduct as one factor to be considered in a custody
determination, rather than as constituting unfitness per se. Nevertheless,
cases involving lesbian or gay male custodians who maintain live-in or other
relationships with persons of the same sex often enough provoke judicial
high dudgeon."1
'5 See CLARK, supra note 13, at 803-04.
16 The heterosexual conduct of the custodial parent, while still constituting a factor in
child custody disputes, would not amount to parental unfitness per se if the parent were
otherwise discreet in his or her conduct. See, e.g., Brinkley v. Brinkley, 336 S.E.2d 901 (Va.
Ct. App. 1985); Davis v. Davis, 372 A.2d 231 (Md. 1977); In re Dahlman's Marriage, 531 P.2d
909 (Or. Ct. App. 1975). See also Annotation, Custodial Parent's Sexual Relations with Third
Person as Justifying Modification of Child Custody Order, 100 A.L.R.3d 625 (1980). Thus,
the parent's sexual conduct would only have a detrimental effect on the child if the child knew
of that conduct. See, e.g., Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975). See generally Nora
Lauerman, Nonmarital Sexual Conduct and Child Custody, 46 U. CINN. L. REv. 647 (1977).
" See GREGORY, supra note 13, at 377.
1995-96]
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Accordingly, when dealing with child custody disputes involving gay or
lesbian parents, the courts generally have applied one of three tests to
determine the custodial "fitness" of the gay male or lesbian parent: (1) a per
se approach; (2) a middle ground "presumptive" approach; and (3) a "nexus"
approach.
A. The Per Se Approach
In spite of increased social tolerance to homosexuality in recent years, a
number of courts have continued to deny custody or visitation rights to
homosexual parents on the sole basis that such homosexual conduct or
orientation makes the individual an "unfit" custodial parent as a matter of
law.' The rationale behind this per se approach is based on a number of
interrelated perceptions.
First, the per se approach has been premised upon the illegality of
homosexual relations 9 which are prohibited by state statutes that criminalize
sodomy and the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the
constitutionality of these statutes in Bowers v. Hardwick.2  It is estimated
however, that approximately ninety percent of married and unmarried
heterosexual couples also engage in similar sexual conduct,2' and just because
a particular state has enacted a sodomy statute does not necessarily mean a
" See, e.g., S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314
N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981); Newsome v. Newsome, 256 S.E.2d 849 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); M.J.P.
v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982); Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
See generally Stone, supra note 2, at 721-28; Beargie, supra note 2, at 74-75. See also Wanda
E. Wakefield, Annotation, Initial Award or Denial of Child Custody to Homosexual or Lesbian
Parent, 6 A.L.R.4th 1297 (1981); Carroll J. Miller, Annotation, Visitation Rights of
Homosexual or Lesbian Parent, 36 A.L.R.4th 997 (1985).
'" See, e.g., Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981) (recognizing that
sexual relationship between two persons of same sex is not a legal relationship); See also Roe
v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985) (calling father's homosexual relationship unlawful in light
of the fact that sodomy is a class six felony under Virginia law).
20 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Four dissenting judges criticized the majority opinion in Bowers
for not addressing the constitutionality of the statute as a whole as applied to both heterosexual
and homosexual acts alike. 478 U.S. at 200. Ironically, Justice Lewis Powell, Jr., the swing
vote in Bowers v. Hardwick, subsequently admitted that he had made a mistake in voting with
the majority position. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 530 (1994) ("1
think I probably made a mistake on that one," Powell said of Bowers.).
21 See, e.g., PHILLIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 236 (1983).
[Vol. 34
HeinOnline  -- 34 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 848 1995-1996
CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTE
court is bound to apply aper se approach rather than a "nexus" approach in
determining the custodial rights of gay or lesbian parents.22
Courts also base the per se approach upon judicial perceptions that the
child of a homosexual parent "may have difficulties in achieving a fulfilling
heterosexual identity of his or her own in the future, 23 or that a child would
bear an "intolerable burden" because of the perceived "social condemnation"
attached to homosexuality which would "inevitably harm" the child's
relationship with his or her peers and with the community at large. 4
However, empirical social science research data from the mid-1980s has
largely negated and dispelled this largely subjective and unfounded judicial
concern.
2 5
22 For example, Massachusetts, Michigan, and South Carolina all have sodomy
prohibitions, but do not use them to justify aper se approach to parental fitness. Instead, these
states employ a "nexus" test requiring a factual showing of harm to the child from the parent's
homosexual conduct. See, e.g., Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1215 (Mass. 1980); Hall
v. Hall, 291 N.W.2d 143, 144 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704,
705 (S.C. 1987). See generally Pershing, supra note 4, at 292-98 n.13. See also infra notes
106, 156, 220, 243 and accompanying text.
23 S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
24 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981); M.I.P. v. J.G.P., 640
P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982); Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641 (Utah 1980).
2 See, e.g., Flaks, supra note 2, at 371 ("The social science literature reviewed here
demonstrates clearly that lesbians and gay men can and do raise psychologically healthy
children. In fact, no evidence has emerged to date which suggests that homosexual parents are
inferior to their heterosexual counterparts, or that their children are in any regard
compromised."). See also Sharon L. Huggins, A Comparative Study of Self-Esteem of
Adolescent Children of Divorced Lesbian Mothers and Divorced Heterosexual Mothers in
HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE FAMILY 123, 132 (Frederick W. Bozett ed. 1989); Susan Golombok
et al., Children in Lesbian and Single-Parent Households: Psychosexual and Psychiatric
Appraisal, 24 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 551, 565-67 (1983); Gregory M. Herek, Myths
About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research, I LAW & SEXUALITY
133 (1991); Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD
DEVELOPMENT 1025 (1992). But see Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1981) (court was persuaded by a psychologist, Dr. Tom Biller, who expressed grave concerns
about the harmful effects that could occur to the child by being raised by a lesbian mother. Dr.
Biller opined that the practice of homosexuality is not socially acceptable, is a learned practice,
and is damaging to the proper development of the child.). See Stone, supra note 2, at 721-22.
1995-96]
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Prior to the Bottoms decision, a number of commentators 26 had stated the
Virginia Supreme Court in the case of Roe v. Roe27 applied aper se judicial
approach toward gay and lesbian parents in child custody disputes. In Roe,
the Virginia Supreme Court heard the complaint of a mother who alleged the
father continuously exposed their nine-year-old daughter to his active
homosexual relationship in the same household with his daughter. The
evidence presented was that the father and his homosexual lover were
hugging, kissing, and sleeping in the same bed in an indiscreet manner.
Additionally, other homosexuals had visited the home and engaged in similar
behavior in the presence of the child. Although in a previous case, Doe v.
Doe,28 the Virginia Supreme Court had declared a mother's lesbian lifestyle
does not constitute unfitness per se in an adoption case, the Roe court
expressed grave concern that the father allegedly had "flaunted" his
homosexual relationship,29 and then concluded:
The father's continuous exposure of the child to his immoral and illicit
relationship renders him an unfit and improper custodian as a matter of law.
... [W]e have no hesitancy in saying that the conditions under which this
child must live daily are not only unlawful but also impose an intolerable
burden upon her by reason of the social condemnation attached to them,
which will inevitably afflict her relationships with her peers and with the
community at large.30
However, the Dailey case was decided prior to the publication of most of the empirical social
science data listed above.
This prevailing social science research rebutting any alleged adverse effects of
homosexual parents on their children was summarized in the amicus curiae brief in support of
Sharon Bottoms by attorneys for the American Psychological Association, the American
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and the National Association of Social Workers.
See Pershing, supra note 4, at 305 n.50. See also infra note 120 and accompanying text.
26 See, e.g.. Stone, supra note 2, at 723; Beargie, supra note 2, at 74; Pershing, supra
note 4, at 312-18. See also CLARK, supra note 13, at 805. But see SWISHER ET AL., VIRGINIA
FAMILY LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 628-29 (1991 and Supp. 1994) (explaining that in Doe
v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981) the Virginia Supreme Court refused to declare a homosexual
parent unfit per-se, but pointing out that this was an adoption case rather than a child custody
case).
27 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985).
2 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981).
29 Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 693.
'" Id. at 694 (citing Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981)).
[Vol. 34
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It might initially appear from this case excerpt from Roe that the Virginia
Supreme Court has indeed adopted a per se unfitness approach in child
custody disputes involving gay and lesbian parents. A closer reading of
earlier Virginia precedent, however, including Doe v. Doe3 and Brown v.
Brown,32 puts this per se unfitness classification of Roe in some doubt.33
Thus, whether Roe v. Roe actually established a per se rule in Virginia, as
applied to gay and lesbian parents in child custody disputes, became a crucial
issue in the Bottoms case.
B. The Middle Ground "Presumptive "Approach
Though not always clearly articulated by the courts that arguably apply
it, some courts that have rejected the per se approach,34 but are unwilling to
adopt a "nexus" approach have used a "middle ground" or "presumptive"
31 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981) (holding that a lesbian mother was not per se an unfit
custodian in an adoption case). See supra note 28 and accompanying text. See also infra note
48 and accompanying text.
32 237 S.E.2d 89 (Va. 1977) (custodial mother divested of custody of her two children,
ages 4 and 7, after the evidence indicated that the mother was openly and indiscreetly
cohabiting with a boyfriend over an extended period of time, coupled with a showing that the
children were aware of the relationship, were not faring well, and were neglected.). Brown did
not establish aper se rule, however, and the Roe court cited Brown as precedent. Moreover,
if the custodial parent and his or her paramour were discreet in their relationship, even though
living under the same roof, this would not constitute unfitness. See, e.g., Sutherland v.
Sutherland, 414 S.E.2d 617 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) and Ford v. Ford, 419 S.E.2d 415 (Va. Ct.
App. 1992) (both involving heterosexual parents and applying a "nexus" approach). See also
infra note 50 and accompanying text.
13 See SwIsHER ET AL., VIRGINIA FAMILY LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 629 (1991)
("Whether or not one agrees with the Roe court's views regarding homosexuality, it was in
many ways a predictable result. Roe involved an extreme set of facts which pushed the Court
to the limit, the most significant of which was no different from the fact in Brown: [indiscreet]
cohabitation with a lover. In this critical respect, the father in Roe was treated no differently
than the mother in Brown. The real test of whether homosexuality is in itself a detriment to
custody will not arise until a case presents itself [in Virginia] where the conduct of the
homosexual parent in the presence of the child is not an issue.").
34 See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
1995-96]
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approach to gay and lesbian parents." These courts have found that it is not
the mere homosexuality which renders a parent unfit, but the presence of a
homosexual lover or other evidence of active homosexuality in the home
which creates an environment which cannot be in the best interests of the
child. Such courts will weigh the fitness of a parent aside from his or her
sexual orientation. If the parent is fit, custody may be granted but will be
conditioned upon the parent maintaining certain standards of behavior. 36
Although there is little, if any, credible social science evidence supporting
the per se approach in gay and lesbian child custody disputes,37 one
commentator has argued that some empirical social science data does exist to
support a "middle ground" or "presumptive" custodial approach applied to
both heterosexual and homosexual custodial parents.38 Citing a 1988 study at
the Philadelphia Child Guidance Clinic39 with approval, this commentator
argues there is a demonstrated psychological and sociological basis for the
Virginia Supreme Court - and other state courts - to presume that children
are likely to be harmed when exposed to a parent's unmarried cohabitation.4"
" See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
36 See Beargie, supra note 2, at 75-76. See also Hall v. Hall, 291 N.W.2d 144 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1980) (wife's homosexuality was considered as only one factor in the court's
determination of the moral fitness of a custodial parent); N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (conditioning grant of custody of a daughter to her lesbian mother on the
mother's refraining from living with her lover in the child's presence); Constant A. v. Paul A.,
496 A.2d I (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (applying presumption that traditional family environment
was better for the child than lesbian environment).
17 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
3" See Katherine A. Salmon, Note, Child Custody Modification Based on a Parent's Non-
Marital Cohabitation: Protecting the Best Interests of the Child in Virginia, 27 U. RICH. L. REV.
915 (1993) [hereinafter Salmon].
9 Maria B. Isaacs & George H. Leon, Remarriage and Its Alternatives Following
Divorce: Mother and Child Adjustment, 14 J. MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY 163 (1988).
4 See Salmon, supra note 38, at 916-18. The study found that children whose mothers
had live-in partners had a greater degree of maladjustment, evidenced by substantially higher
scores for behavior problems. Their poor adjustment similarly was reflected by lower scores
on a social competence scale, with older children and adolescents experiencing the greatest
difficulty. Thus, in a situation where an unmarried heterosexual or homosexual mother lived
with her partner, a "deleterious effect on child outcome" resulted. Salmon, supra note 38, at
917 (quoting Maria B. lsaacs & George H. Leon, Remarriage and Its Alternatives Following
Divorce: Mother and Child Adjustment, 14 J. MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY 163, 163 (1988)).
[Vol. 34
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The commentator concludes a middle ground "presumptive" approach is thus
preferable to either aper se approach or a "nexus" approach.41
C. The "Nexus"Approach
A growing number of courts have adopted a "nexus" approach in child
custody disputes, holding a parent's gay or lesbian sexual orientation or sexual
conduct should have no bearing in a child custody determination unless
4' According to one commentator:
The nexus approach.., does not consider either the moral dimension of cohabitation
or the potentially harmful long-term effect it has on children. While cohabitation
should not be the sole litmus test by which fitness for custody is determined, neither
should it be ignored. Even if [a court] finds nothing morally troubling in unmarried
cohabitation, such a relationship certainly warrants close judicial scrutiny when the
emotional health of a child is at stake. A standard which establishes a rebuttable
presumption that cohabitation is harmful would return the burden of proof to the
cohabiting parent, whose conduct threatens to harm the child. This standard would
give the cohabiting parent the opportunity to produce evidence that his or her child
is either not susceptible to the harmful effects of unmarried cohabitation, or that the
alternative of shifting custody to the other parent would be more damaging to the
child than the negative impact of the cohabitation.
A rebuttable presumption would reinstate non-marital cohabitation as a factor in
[child custody] cases [by] acknowledging evidence that children are likely to be
harmed when exposed to such living situations. Moreover, the rebuttable presumption
avoids absolute preferences for either parent, so that the overall goal of meeting the
child's best interests is not eclipsed by extreme rules on either side.
Salmon, supra note 38, at 932-33. But see supra notes 2 and 25, and infra 160 and
accompanying text.
One problem with this presumptive test when applied to gay and lesbian nonmarital
cohabitation is that even if gay or lesbian couples desired to marry, the vast majority of states
prohibit such same-sex marriage. See, e.g., In re Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684 (N.Y.
Surrogate's Ct. 1990); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). But see Baehr v. Lewin,
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1994) (questioning whether same-sex marriage prohibitions violate the equal
protection provisions of the Hawaii Constitution). Subsequently, the Hawaii legislature stated
that its marriage statutes applied only to male-female, and not same-sex, couples. 1994 Haw.
Sess. Laws 217.
1995-96]
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credible evidence is presented to show such orientation or conduct has a
detrimental or adverse affect on the child.42
This "nexus" approach in child custody disputes is based in large part on
recent empirical social science evidence demonstrating gay and lesbian
parents can and do raise psychologically healthy children,43 and that "what the
evidence suggests is that courts determining parental fitness among lesbian
and gay individuals need not apply special presumptions, nor require expert
evaluations, which depart from typical methods of psychosocial assessment.
Instead, the literature is consistent with appropriate case-by-case evaluations
of lesbian and gay families based on the same criteria employed with
heterosexual parent families." 44 Under this "nexus" approach, therefore,
heterosexual and homosexual custodial parents in child custody disputes are
evaluated under the same legal principles and standards.45
For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Bezio v. Patenaude,46
defined the "nexus" approach in this way:
A finding that a parent is unfit to further the welfare of the child must be
predicated upon parental behavior which adversely affects the child. The
State may not deprive parents of custody of their children "simply because
their households fail to meet the ideals approved by the community ... [or]
simply because the parents embrace ideologies or pursue life-styles at odds
with the average."47
42 See, e.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985); Birdsall v. Birdsall, 243 Cal.
Rptr. 287 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Peyton v.
Peyton, 457 So. 2d 321 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass.
1980); Guinan v. Guinan, 477 N.Y.S.2d 830 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Conkel v. Conkel, 509
N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987);
In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886 (Wash. 1983). See Pershing, supra note 4, at 312
n.88. See also Stone, supra note 2, at 730-37; Beargie, supra note 2, at 76-78.
' See generally supra notes 2 and 25 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 38-41
and accompanying text.
" Flaks, supra note 2, at 371-72.
45 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
46 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980).
47 410 N.E.2d at 1216 (citing In re a Minor, 393 N.E.2d 379, 383 (1979)). See also
S.N.E. v. R.L.E., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985) ("It is impermissible to rely on any real or
imagined social stigma attaching to the Mother's status as a lesbian."); Conkel v. Conkel, 509
N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) ("This court cannot take into consideration the
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Curiously, the Virginia Supreme Court had quoted with approval the
Bezio case in Doe v. Doe,4" holding a natural parent's homosexual orientation
in Virginia did not render her an unfit parent per se in an adoption case, but
the Virginia Supreme Court declined to follow Bezio in the subsequent case
of Roe v. Roe.49 Moreover, the Virginia Court of Appeals applied the "nexus"
approach in two subsequent child custody disputes involving heterosexual
custodial parents who had cohabited with their lovers in the same household.'
The trial and appellate judges in Bottoms v. Bottoms thus had to determine
whether Virginia should apply a per se approach, a middle ground
"presumptive" approach, or a "nexus" approach in this particular child
custody dispute involving a lesbian mother and a heterosexual grandmother.
unpopularity of homosexuals in society when its duty is to facilitate and guard a fundamental
parent-child relationship."); M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1262-63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1979) (holding that the risk of social condemnation "does not necessarily portend" that the
child's "moral welfare or safety will be jeopardized"). C.f Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429
(1984) (holding that the likelihood of private bias against the child of an interracial couple is
an impermissible basis for transferring custody).
48 284 S.E.2d 799, 806 (Va. 1981) (quoting Bezio, 410 N.E.2d at 1215-16). The court
further stated:
If Jane Doe is an unfit parent, it is solely her lesbian relationship which renders her
unfit, and this must be to such an extent as to make the continuance of the parent-
child relationship heretofore existing between her and her son detrimental to the
child's welfare. The petitioners introduced no evidence, scientific or otherwise, to
establish this fact. Regardless of how offensive we may find Jane Doe's life-style, its
effect on her son's welfare is not a matter of which we can take judicial notice.
Id. at 805. The Virginia Supreme Court therefore applied a "nexus" approach in this particular
case.
" See Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985). Roe is discussed supra in notes 27-30
and accompanying text.
'" See Sutherland v. Sutherland, 414 S.E.2d 617 (Va. Ct. App. 1992); Ford v. Ford, 419
S.E.2d 415 (Va. Ct. App. 1992). But see SwIsHER ET" AL., VIRGINIA FAMILY LAW: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 154 (Supp. 1994) ("Whether Sutherland and Ford reflect what the Supreme Court
of Virginia would hold under similar circumstances remains to be seen.").
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III. PAMELA KAY BOTTOMS v. SHARON LYNNE BOTTOMS
A. History of the Dispute
In February of 1993, Pamela Kay Bottoms (Kay), Tyler's grandmother,
sued for custody of her grandson. According to Kay, she did this because she
thought Tyler would "end up getting hurt" by being exposed to the open
lesbian relationship between his mother, Sharon Bottoms, and her lover, April
Wade." Sharon's version of Kay's motivation, however, was that Sharon and
April had refused to allow Tyler to stay with Kay on the weekends.52
The initial custody hearing was held in the Henrico County, Virginia
Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court before Judge William G.
Boice on March 31, 1993. The hearing lasted only 45 minutes and resulted
in a one-paragraph order granting custody of Tyler to Kay and allowing
Sharon reasonable visitation with her son "but not in the presence of her
lesbian lover.
53
Following Judge Boice's ruling, Deborah Kelly, a staff writer for the
Richmond Times Dispatch, picked-up the Bottoms' child custody dispute, and
thereafter news of this intergenerational battle between a lesbian woman and
her disapproving mother traveled quickly through the United States, as well
as several foreign countries. According to The New York Times, the ruling
"delivered a legal shock to the nation's homosexuals. 5 4
5' Trial Court Transcript at 69, Bottoms v. Bottoms, CH93JA0517-00 (Henrico Co., Va.
Cir. Ct. Sept. 7, 1993).
2 See Deborah Kelly, Case Pits Mother Against Daughter, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH,
April 19, 1993 at B-I. This article discusses that Sharon elaborated on her reasons for this
action by explaining that following a period of professional counseling, she confronted Kay
with the fact that as a teenager Sharon had been sexually abused on approximately 800
occasions by Kay's live-in lover of seventeen years, Tommy Conley. [Sharon's allegation of
sexual abuse by Tommy Conley was later corroborated in a voluntary polygraph test submitted
on Sharon by David E. Boone, guardian ad litem for Tyler.] Sharon decided at that point it
would be best if Tyler spent less time at Kay's house when Tommy Conley was present. Kay
subsequently ordered Tommy to move out of her house during the custody dispute because her
lawyer "thought it would be best."
" In re Doustou, No. J-32, 113-01 (Henrico County, Va. Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Dist. Ct. March 31, 1993). Judge Boice cited Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985)
as precedent, apparently applying Roe as a per se rule. See supra notes 27-30 and
accompanying text.
" B. Drummond Ayers, Jr., Judge's Decision in Custody Case Raises Concerns, TIMES,
Sept. 9, 1993, at A 16.
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The American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia offered to represent
Sharon in her de novo appeal of Judge Boice's decision to the Henrico County
Circuit Court." Donald K. Butler, a prominent Richmond family law
practitioner, agreed to work with the ACLU on a pro bono basis as a
"cooperating attorney."56 Richard R. Ryder, a noted criminal defense attorney
in Richmond, represented Kay Bottoms. One local newspaper columnist
described Ryder as "the eminently quotable, even outspoken, good ol' boy
with a law degree, who got locally famous decades ago by representing
criminals and occasionally running for Congress or the City Council."5"
On September 7, 1993, Judge Buford M. Parsons heard the six-hour
emotionally-charged de novo hearing in the Henrico County, Virginia Circuit
Court. A capacity crowd, which included various wire services' reporters,
numerous newspaper reporters for publications ranging from the New York
Times to USA Today, and a courtroom artist from a major television network,
attended the hearing.
Richard Ryder, attorney for Kay Bottoms, who had the burden of going
forward with the evidence, first called Sharon Bottoms as an adverse witness.
Through Sharon, Mr. Ryder established that Sharon and April Wade
frequently would hug and kiss each other in their home and occasionally pat
each other on the bottom. 8 Sharon also admitted during her testimony that
" Bottoms v. Bottoms, No. CH93JA0517-00 (Henrico Co., Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 7, 1993).
Stephen B. Pershing represented Sharon as co-counsel for the ACLU. See supra notes 4 and
7 and accompanying text.
56 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Ray McAllister, Virginia isfor Talk Shows, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Sept. 15,
1993, at BI. Mr. Ryder previously had gained national attention in the legal community, and
particularly in law school legal ethics courses, as the defendant in In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360
(E.D. Va. 1967).
s' Trial Court Transcript at 10-11, Bottoms v. Bottoms, CH93JA0517-00 (Henrico Co.,
Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 7, 1993). This section of the trial court transcript would be quoted numerous
times by Mr. Ryder. See Appellee's Appellate Brief at 3, Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276
(Va. Ct. App. 1994) and Petition for Appeal of Pamela Kay Bottoms at 7, Virginia Supreme
Court. Mr. Ryder also used these words in describing Sharon's "homosexual conduct" on the
syndicated "Sally Jesse Raphael Show" and on CNN's "Larry King Live."
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she and April engaged in oral sex once or twice a week.59 There was
testimony that Sharon had "screamed" at Tyler, had "popped him on his leg
too hard a couple of times" and had "left fingerprints on his leg."60
Kay Bottoms, in her testimony, described a situation where Tyler, after
visiting with Sharon, told himself to go and stand in the comer. A photograph
was introduced displaying this conduct.6' There was also testimony that Tyler
screamed and cried when Sharon and April came to pick him up from Kay's
house, and that he didn't want to leave with Sharon and April.62 Additionally,
evidence was presented when Tyler was brought back to Kay's home after
Tuesday night visitations with his mother, that Tyler could not sit down in the
bathtub because Sharon had neglected to change his diapers.63 However, on
cross-examination by Tyler's guardian ad litem, David Boone, Kay admitted
that she had no reason to believe that Tyler had been physically abused.'
Two additional witnesses were called in Kay's case in chief, Kenneth Wayne
Bottoms, Sharon's brother, and Angela Price, a friend of Kay's, who both
testified that in their opinion Sharon was not a good mother, and that they did
not approve of Sharon's lesbian lifestyle with April Wade.6
Sharon Bottoms' attorneys called Carolyn Campbell, a court psychologist,
on Sharon's behalf. Ms. Campbell testified she had evaluated Sharon, Kay,
and Tyler by running them through a full battery of psychological tests. A
report of her finding was presented into evidence. Ms. Campbell testified she
had observed Tyler with Kay and with Sharon, and found that Tyler was "very
comfortable" with the both of them, that Sharon set limits when they were
Trial Court Transcript at 12.
0 Id. at 45. Evidence also was presented that Sharon had cursed in front of Tyler, that
Tyler used the words "shit" and "damn" that were not used in his grandmother's home, that
Tyler often had temper tantrums, and that Sharon had been absent for unexplained periods of
time when Tyler was staying at Kay's home.
61 Id. at 56.
61 Id. at 57.
63 Id. at 70.
" Id. at 83.
63 Id. at 91-98. Ms. Price also testified that April Wade had threatened that she "might
end up killing somebody." Id. at 97. Further evidence was presented that April Wade is a
recovering alcoholic who has a child now living in North Carolina with his adoptive parents.
Id. at41, 49.
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necessary, and that Kay was "less flexible and probably more rigid in her
perception of parenting.""
Sharon's attorneys then called Dr. Rochelle Klinger, a psychiatrist at the
Medical College of Virginia, who testified she had met with Sharon and April
in an effort to assess Sharon's mental health as an individual and the mental
health of Sharon and April as a couple. She expressed her opinion that they
were "a healthy, well-functioning couple and interacted very well together."67
David Boone, the court-appointed guardian ad litem for Tyler, brought in
as an expert witness a noted child psychologist, Dr. Charlotte Patterson. Dr.
Patterson testified concerning extensive research she had conducted in the
area of social and personal development of children and adolescents, and more
specifically the effects of gay and lesbian parenting on child development.6"
Dr. Patterson expressed her opinion, derived from her own studies as well as
reviewing the research of others,69 that "children of lesbian parents are equally
as solid in their gender identity as masculine or feminine as are children of
heterosexual parents."70 In addition, she stated "children of lesbian mothers
are equally likely to exhibit the expected gender role behavior as are kids of
heterosexual parents."'" In response to a question concerning the possibility
that children of lesbian and gay parents will be taunted and teased by their
peers, Dr. Patterson responded:
[A]II children are going to be teased, aren't they, about something, and most
families differ from the average in some way or another, and many of us are,
in fact, teased for those reasons. What's important is not whether or not
teasing occurs, in my opinion, but how it's handled and whether the child has
the support of a loving parent in learning to deal with it.72
66 Id. at 139-41.
67 Id. at 153-54.
68 See Patterson, supra note 2.
69 See supra notes 2 and 25 and accompanying text.
7" Trial Court Transcript at 118.
7' Id. at 123.
72 Id.
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At the conclusion of the testimony, counsel argued their respective
positions. Richard Ryder, on behalf of Kay Bottoms, urged the court to
follow the precedent of the 1985 Virginia Supreme Court case of Roe v. Roe.73
Mr. Ryder argued Roe stood for the proposition that a homosexual
relationship renders a parent per se unfit as a matter of law.74 On the other
hand, Donald Butler, on behalf of Sharon Bottoms, urged the court to reject
the per se approach espoused by Mr. Ryder and asked the court instead to
apply a "nexus" test as found in the 1981 Virginia Supreme Court case of Doe
v. Doe.75 Mr. Butler also argued that the Roe decision should be distinguished
from Bottoms because Roe was a case involving a parent versus parent child
custody dispute which applied a preponderance of the evidence rule, whereas
Bottoms involved a parent versus third party dispute which required proof of
parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.76
Mr. Boone, the court-appointed guardian ad litem for Tyler, concluded as
follows:
The homosexual issue does not alarm me. And I will tell the Court that in
my opinion, for whatever it's worth, I believe that a homosexual should be
allowed to raise a child. I have no question with that whatsoever, if the
particular parent is a good parent.... I don't think the fact a parent's sexual
orientation is different than the mainstream should in and of itself be a litmus
test as to whether that parent should be allowed to raise the child.
But in this case, we have a situation where Sharon is living openly with
another homosexual. They are kissing and hugging in front of the child, and
obviously they are not married to one another because they can't marry one
another. But the bottom line is whether April was a man or woman, I would
have the same problem. Two adults raising a child without benefit of
marriage, to me influences me, for whatever it's worth. And I think as
guardian ad litem I've got to say through my eyes that it would be in the best
interests of Tyler to be with the grandmother because of that relationship."
" 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985).
14 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
75 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981) ("We are not prepared to say that homosexuals are per se
unfit to have custody of their children..."). See also supra notes 45-50 and accompanying
text.
76 See, e.g., Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824, 827 (Va. 1986).
77 Trial Court Transcript at 188-89, Bottoms v. Bottoms, CH 93JA0517-00 (Henrico Co.,
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After a short recess, Judge Parsons rendered his decision:
There is no case directly on point concerning all of these matters. In the case
of Roe v. Roe, it's certainly of assistance to me in reaching a decision here
today. I will tell you first that the mother's conduct is illegal. It is a Class 6
felony in the Commonwealth of Virginia. I will tell you that it is the opinion
of this Court that her conduct is immoral. And it is the opinion of this Court
that the conduct of Sharon Bottoms renders her an unfit parent.78
Disregarding the testimony and the empirical social science data presented
by Dr. Charlotte Patterson,79 Judge Parsons then quoted the pivotal excerpt in
Roe v. Roe 0 concerning the perceived "social condemnation" which would
"inevitably afflict" the child. He stated:
I find that to be applicable in this case. I further find that in addition to this,
there is other evidence of the child being affected or afflicted with the
evidence which is unrebutted of the cursing, the evidence of the child
standing in the comer.
From all the facts and circumstances that I have heard here today, all the
circumstances of the case, it is the order of the Court that the custody will be
with the grandmother, Kay Bottoms. That Sharon, the mother will have
visitation specifically on Monday."'
Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 7, 1993). Mr. Butler responded to Mr. Boone's comments: "[O]ne of the
things [Sharon] can't do is she can't make herself an honest woman and marry April. If this
were as Mr. Boone compares it to a heterosexual situation, she doesn't have that option. So she
stands before you asking the Court to consider her right to have an association with her son, and
her son with her ... a relationship that she intends to be permanent, as permanent as any
relationship can be these days." Id. at 192.
7 Id. at 196.
79 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
80 See Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) (citing Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314
N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982); Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d
641 (Utah 1980)).
" Trial Court Transcript at 197, Bottoms v. Bottoms, CH 93JA0517-00 (Sept. 7, 1993).
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Thus, Judge Parsons, like Judge Boice before him,82 once again applied Roe
v. Roe in aper se manner to the Bottoms case.83
B. The Media Reaction to the Bottoms Case
Following the initial custody hearing in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations District Court, 4 Deborah Kelly, a staff writer for the Richmond
Times Dispatch, described Tyler's custody battle in an article entitled "Case
Pits Mother Against Daughter." 5 "Are lesbians unfit mothers?" she asked.
"The case exemplifies what the gay community says is homosexual
discrimination at its most fundamental level." 6 The story immediately caught
the attention of the gay and lesbian community and the American Civil
Liberties Union. Kent Willis, Director of the ACLU of Virginia: "The simple
matter is that the grandparent doesn't approve of her daughter's lifestyle and
feels that she is moralistically superior to her daughter because she's
heterosexual." He also stated that because of President Clinton's stand on
gays in the military, "it's perceived as political dynamite."87
In a subsequent article dated May 23, 1993, Ms. Kelly reported, "Civil
rights lawyers say the Virginia ruling is one of the most blatantly anti-gay in
the country."88 The Executive Director of the National Center for Lesbian
Rights, San Francisco attorney Elizabeth Henderickson, 9 was quoted as
saying: "Virginia is the only state that has explicitly declared that being a
lesbian is an adequate reason to lose custody of your child.... Virginia is on
the far end of the spectrum in terms of having institutionalized through a court
decision homophobia that denies women custody of their kids."'
82 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
" See Pershing, supra note 4, at 312-18.
14 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
" Deborah Kelly, Case Pits Mother Against Daughter, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH,
April 19, 1993, atBl.
86 Id.
87 Id.
'8 Deborah Kelly, Lesbian Gets Ally the ACLU, RcHMoND TIMEs DISPATCH, May 23,
1993, at Al.
89 Ms. Henderickson later contributed to the preparation of an amicus curiae brief on
Sharon's behalf and on behalf of the National Center for Lesbian Rights, et al. See supra note
It.
9' Deborah Kelly, Lesbian Gets Ally the ACLU, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, May 23,
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On September 6, 1993, a day before the Henrico County Circuit Court
hearing, a wire report from the Associated Press announced "Gay rights
advocates are closely watching a potential landmark case in Virginia, where
a judge will consider whether a woman may retain custody of her lesbian
daughter's two-year-old son."' The article quoted Sharon's lawyer, Donald
Butler, as stating "The question is whether a parent should be disqualified
because of her sexual orientation or lifestyle." Ann Kincaid, spokesperson for
the Family Foundation, however, countered "Is it discrimination based on
sexual orientation, or is it child protection based on the mother's sexual
behavior?"92
By September 7, 1993 hearing in the Henrico County Circuit Court,
Tyler's custody battle had reached far beyond the boundaries of the
Commonwealth of Virginia, and had received attention not only from the gay
community and several conservative groups, but from families of all
descriptions and the nation at large. The case was broadcast as a lead story on
all the major television news networks across the country, and once the story
was reported in the news wires, the Bottoms case made headlines not only
throughout the United States, but also in foreign newspapers ranging from the
Ottawa Citizen and Calgary Herald in Canada to the Agence France Presse
in Europe. National Public Radio's "All Things Considered," NBC's "The
Today Show," ABC's "Good Morning America," CBS's "Morning News," and
a call-in poll conducted on "Fox News at Noon" in New York City all
discussed the Bottoms case.
Both sides were immediately barraged with numerous requests to appear
on television news and talk shows. Richard Ryder, Kay's attorney, appeared
on CBS's "Eye to Eye with Connie Chung", along with Sharon Bottoms and
April Wade. The following week Sharon and her attorney Donald Butler
1993, at Al.
91 Associated Press, Woman Seeks to Keep Lesbian Daughter's Son-The Mother's Only
Alleged Parental Shortcoming Has Been Her Sexuality, NORFOLK VIRGINIAN-PILOT, September
6, 1993, at D2.
92 Id.
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appeared on CNN's "Larry King Live." The show included a time for viewers
to call in and ask questions of the guests and, not surprisingly, two of the
callers that evening were Richard Ryder, Kay's attorney, and David Boone,
the guardian ad litem for Tyler. The Bottoms story also aired as a segment of
CBS's "20/20" and ABC's "Prime Time Live." Kay Bottoms appeared with
Richard Ryder on the Sally Jesse Raphael Show, and Mr. Ryder appeared on
the Geraldo Rivera Show.
Newspapers and magazines around the country reported the Bottoms case
"stirred praise of conservatives and outrage of gay activists."93
"Conservatives hailed the judge's ruling as a vindication of crusades against
legitimizing homosexuality. Liberals denounced its prejudice masquerading
as jurisprudence." 4 The story "touched a nerve"95 and "provoked a national
uproar.""6 One local reporter described the media barrage surrounding the
Bottoms case as "a cause celebre for and against gay rights, and it's brought
a national spotlight [on Virginia] .... What is a family tragedy - any way
you look at it - became a sociological study and, in turn, material for all
those TV hours that need to be filled."' 7 What was seldom, if ever, discussed
in all this media attention over Sharon's lesbian lifestyle in the Bottoms child
custody dispute, however, was the best interests of young Tyler.
C. Sharon Bottoms'Appeal to the Virginia Court of Appeals
As expected, Sharon Bottoms' attorneys appealed Judge Parsons' circuit
court decision9" to the Virginia Court of Appeals, Virginia's intermediate
appellate court. Sharon's attorneys requested an expedited appeal based on the
detrimental impact that a long separation would have on young Tyler. Oral
arguments were heard by a three-member panel on February 16, 1994, sooner
than it normally would have been argued in the regular course of the appellate
9 Lesbian Ruling Stirs Fury, Praise USA TODAY, September 9, 1993, at A3.
4 William A. Henry, III, Gay Parents: Under Fire and on the Rise, TIME, September
20, 1993, at 66.
" Custody Ruling Fuels Gay Rights Discussion, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, September 12,
1993, at 25.
96 Id.
17 Ray McAllister, Virginia is for Talk Shows, RIcHMoND TIMEs DISPATCH, September
15, 1993, at BI.
"' See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
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process. Although Sharon's lawyers were hopeful that they might also receive
a prompt ruling, it was not until June 21, 1994, the Virginia Court of Appeals
reached a decision, almost a month after the Virginia Court of Appeals
rendered a decision in another case argued on the same day as the Bottoms
appeal."
1. The Appellant's Argument
The major focus of Sharon Bottoms' Appellant Brief and oral argument
was to distinguish the Bottoms case from Roe v. Roe."°  The primary
distinction was that Roe involved a custody dispute between two parents,
whereas Bottoms was a custody dispute between a parent and a third party
grandmother.'I ' This distinction was crucial. If a third party, including a
grandmother, wants to deprive a parent of the custody of his or her child under
Virginia law, that party must prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing
evidence, rather than by a preponderance of the evidence, the evidentiary test
in Roe.' 2 Moreover, if the parental presumption is rebutted, then the court
must go on to determine whether or not the best interests of the child require
that custody be transferred to the third party.0 3
" See, e~g., Smith v. Smith, 444 S.E.2d 269 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (argued on February
16, 1994 and decided on May 24, 1994).
""o 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985).
,01 See Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985) (using preponderance of evidence rule in
parent versus parent custody battle). But cf Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824 (Va. 1986)
(requiring proof of parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence in parent versus third
party custody dispute).
"02 See Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824 (Va. 1986). In order to rebut the parental
presumption, a third party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the natural
parent is unfit, (2) the natural parent has already been divested of custody, (3) the natural parent
has voluntarily relinquished custody, (4) the natural parent has abandoned the child, or (5)
special circumstances present a truly extraordinary reason for taking the child away from the
parent. Id. at 827. To rebut the parental presumption by proving "special circumstances," the
third party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child will be seriously harmed
if custody remains with the natural parent. See Mason v. Moon, 385 S.E.2d 242, 245-46
(1989).
1"3 Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 200 S.E.2d 581, 583 (Va. 1973).
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Sharon then argued there had been no showing by clear and convincing
evidence that she was an unfit mother, so the parental presumption had not
been rebutted, and therefore the second "best interests" test need not be
addressed.
The brief then cited four reasons why the circuit court's ruling was
"plainly wrong" and based on insufficient evidence. First, Sharon argued the
circuit court was wrong in holding Sharon was an unfit parent solely based on
her same-sex relationship with April Wade. Instead, a parent's private sexual
conduct should be considered as only one factor in any child custody
determination, utilizing the better-reasoned nexus approach.' °4  Second,
Sharon argued the circuit court was wrong in applying Roe to a third party
versus parent child custody dispute.'0 5 Third, Sharon contended the court
erred because expert testimony presented in the case, based upon credible
social science evidence published since the Roe decision, negated any
presumption or conclusion that a parent in a same-sex relationship is per se
an unfit custodian.0 6 Fourth and finally, Sharon asserted the circuit court
erred because Kay Bottoms did not introduce any other evidence of unfitness
or special circumstances, and certainly not any evidence sufficient to rebut the
parental presumption in favor of Sharon Bottoms by clear and convincing
evidence.0
7
104 See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text. The brief cited these cases as
persuasive authority. The brief also cited as mandatory authority the cases of Doe v. Doe, 284
S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981); Sutherland v. Sutherland, 414 S.E.2d 617 (Va. Ct. App. 1992); and
Ford v. Ford, 419 S.E.2d 415 (Va. Ct. App. 1992), all applying a nexus approach in child
custody disputes.
"'s See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
'o See supra notes 25 and 68-72 and accompanying text. Sharon's brief also argued if
homosexual parents are held to be unfit parents for engaging in conduct prohibited by a state
sodomy statute, so too should heterosexual parents. "If the Court's illegality rationale for
depriving Sharon of custody of her son were [sic] proper, the same reasoning should first have
compelled a finding that Kay's illegal behavior with Tommy Conley over almost two decades
rendered her an unfit custodian, and her petition should have been denied .... Without a
showing of some nexus between Sharon's relationship with April and some harm to the child,
the unprosecuted illegal behavior of Sharon is irrelevant to Kay's burden of proving the
mother's unfitness." Brief of Appellant at 13. See also supra notes 21-22 and 52 and
accompanying text.
W07 Citing Mason v. Moon, 385 S.E.2d 242 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that "when
determining whether a non-parent's evidence is sufficient to rebut the presumption in favor of
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Arguably, one area was not sufficiently addressed in the brief for Sharon
Bottoms, except in a footnote: Judge Parsons' appointment of David Boone
as independent counsel to act as Tyler's guardian ad litem in an attempt to
determine Tyler's best interests. Although the guardian ad litem played a
significant role in the circuit court hearing, especially by presenting the
testimony of Dr. Charlotte Patterson,08 in the end, Mr. Boone's custody
recommendation went against Sharon."° Judge Parsons made no express
reference in his ruling to the guardian ad litem's custody recommendation, so
there is no way of knowing how much weight Judge Parsons placed on Mr.
Boone's recommendation that Kay Bottoms be granted custody of Tyler. °"0
2. The Appellee's Argument
Kay Bottoms' attorney, Richard Ryder, wrote her Appellee's Brief. It was
nine pages long, including the certificate of service page, and cited only two
cases in the table of authorities. Predictably, one of those cases was Roe v.
Roe which Mr. Ryder argued constituted aper se rule of parental unfitness."'
The other case was a 1949 Virginia Supreme Court case standing for the
proposition that in appellate conflicts the Court of Appeals should resolve the
burden of proof in favor of the prevailing party.' 2
After a very brief statement of the facts, Mr. Ryder blamed the American
Civil Liberties Union for creating and exploiting the Bottoms controversy.
"The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) by its advice created the
controversy that now exists and seeks to have this Court resolve this case
granting custody to a natural parent, the trial court must consider all the evidence before it" and
"a parent and child will not be deprived of one another based on surmise and conjecture").
o See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
'o See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
1,0 Subsequently, however, the Virginia Supreme Court placed great weight on the
guardian ad litem's custody recommendation. See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 107-08
(Va. 1995).
. Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985).
112 Nelson v. Liggan, 56 S.E.2d 54 (Va. 1949).
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solely upon the lesbian issue. ' 11 Mr. Ryder attacked the ACLU for advising
Sharon "she could move back in with April and assert her right as a lesbian
and regain custody of Tyler, thereby creating the lesbian controversy which
is presently before the Court.""' 4 Stated somewhat differently three pages
later, "Sharon decided to 'take a chance' with the custody of Tyler and moved
back into April's apartment upon the advice of the ACLU.. ' ..
Unlike Sharon Bottoms' Appellant Brief, the custody recommendation of
the guardian ad litem favoring Kay over Sharon was prominently mentioned
in the Appellee's Brief."6 However, having had the benefit of the Appellant's
Brief - with its multiple arguments and extensive references to leading case
law and empirical studies - it is surprising that Mr. Ryder made no effort to
rebut many of these arguments made by the Appellant. There was no
reference, for example, in Mr. Ryder's brief to the presumption in favor of
parental custody, or to Kay Bottoms' burden of proof."' Nor did Mr. Ryder
attempt to rebut any proffered empirical social science evidence." 8
3. Amicus Curiae Briefs
a. Brief of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry et al. [The AACAP Brie]
A formidable amicus curiae brief was filed in support of Sharon Bottoms
on behalf of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, the
American Psychological Association, the National Association of Social
Workers, Inc., and the Virginia Chapter of the National Association of Social
"3 Brief of Appellee Pamela Kay Bottoms at 1-2.
14 Id. at 2.
"1 Id. at 5.
6 "Based upon his extensive investigation, he concluded that the best interests of Tyler
would be for Kay to have custody of Tyler." Id. at 7.
... See Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985) (using preponderance of evidence for
custody disputes between parents). But cf Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824 (Va. 1986) (using
clear and convincing standard for custody disputes between a parent and a third party). See also
Mason v. Moon, 385 S.E.2d 242, 245-46 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that, to prove special
circumstances, third party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child will be
seriously harmed if custody remains with the natural parent).
,S See supra note 25 and infra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
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Workers, Inc." 9  This well-documented "Brandeis brief" presented an
extensive listing of 45 social science studies and related articles 120
"9 Dr. Rochelle L. Klinger, a psychiatrist at the Medical College of Virginia, who was
one of the witnesses at the Bottoms hearing in the Henrico County Circuit Court, was a
substantial contributor to the preparation of this particular brief. Trial Court Transcript at 153-
54, Bottoms v. Bottoms, CH 93JA0517-00 (Henrico Co., Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 7, 1993). Counsel
for this amicus curiae brief were Carolyn F. Corwin, Christopher A. Crain, and E. Gary Spitko
of Covington & Burling, Washington D.C., and Steven W. Bricker of Bricker & Associates,
Richmond, Virginia.
120 These articles included: Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of the Lesbian Baby Boom:
Behavioral Adjustment, Self-Concepts, and Sex Role Identity in LESBIAN AND GAY
PSYCHOLOGY: THEORY, RESEARCH AND CLINICAL APPLICATIONS (Beverly Greene & Gregory
M. Herek, eds., 1994); American Psychiatric Association, Position Statement on
Homosexuality, April, 1993; National Association of Social Workers, Delegate Assembly,
Policy Statement on Lesbian and Gay Issues, August, 1993; Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of
Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1025 (1992); Gregory M. Herek, Myths
About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research, I LAW & SEXUALITY
133 (1991); Frederick W. Bozett, Gay Fathers: A Review of the Literature, in HOMOSEXUALITY
AND THE FAMILY 137 (Frederick W. Bozett, ed., 1989); Sharon L. Huggins, A Comparative
Study of Self-Esteem of Adolescent Children of Divorced Lesbian Mothers and Divorced
Heterosexual Mothers, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE FAMILY 155 (Frederick W. Bozett, ed.,
1989); Julie S. Gottman, Children of Gay and Lesbian Parents, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE
FAMILY 177 (Frederick W. Bozett, ed., 1989); American Psychological Association, Policy
Statements on Lesbian and Gay Issues, 1987; Richard Green et al., Lesbian Mothers and Their
Children: A Comparison with Solo Parent Heterosexual Mothers and Their Children, 15
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 167 (1986); Steve Susoeff, Assessing Children's Best Interests
When a Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
852 (1985); Susan Golombok et al., Children in Lesbian and Single-Parent Households:
Psychological and Psychiatric Appraisal, 24 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 551 (1983);
Beverly Hoeffer, Children's Acquisition of Sex-Role Behavior in Lesbian-Mother Families, 51
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 536 (1981); Martha Kirkpatrick et al., Lesbian Mothers and Their
Children: A Comparative Study, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 545 (1981); Judith A. Miller et
al., The Child's Home Environment for Lesbian v. Heterosexual Mothers: A Neglected Area of
Research, 7 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 49 (1981); Karen G. Lewis, Children of Lesbians: Their Point
of View, 25 Soc. WORK 198 (1980); Bernard F. Reiss, Psychological Tests in Homosexuality,
in HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR: A MODERN REAPPRAISAL (Judd Marmor, ed., 1980); Brian Miller,
Gay Fathers and Their Children, 28 FAM. COORDINATOR 544 (1979); ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN
S. WEINBuRG, HOMOSEXUALITIES: A STUDY OF DIVERSITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN (1978);
Richard Green, Sexual Identity of37 Children Raised by Homosexual or Transsexual Parents,
135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 692 (1978). See also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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accumulated in an effort to bring the Virginia Court of Appeal's attention to
"the principal body of scientific knowledge pertinent to the questions posed
in this case."''
In addition to the applicable case law dealing with parental
presumptions,' 22 the AACAP Brief contained empirical research from the
social and behavioral sciences pertaining to children and to sexual
orientation. 123 According to this empirical social science literature, lesbians
and gay men have parenting skills comparable to those of heterosexual
parents, and "any presumption of unfitness rests on prejudice and false
stereotypes." 24 In a Resolution dated December 15, 1973, the American
Psychiatric Association declared that "homosexuality per se implies no
impairment in judgment, stability, reliability, or general social or vocational
capabilities."' 121 Moreover, "[t]he social science literature does not indicate
that lesbians and gay men are likely to have traits that would diminish their
effectiveness as parents."' 26  The AACAP Brief addressed the effect on
children being raised by a lesbian mother or gay father and concluded the
social science literature "has consistently found that children raised by lesbian
mothers or gay fathers do not differ significantly from those raised by
heterosexual parents."' 27 In fact, the AACAP Brief noted the conclusion that
the overall psychological health of these children does not differ from that of
children raised by heterosexual parents. 28
In short, the AACAP Brief persuasively argued that current empirical
social science research does not substantiate the subjective fear expressed by
the court in Roe v. Roe 129 of placing a so-called "intolerable burden" on the
12' Brief of Amicus Curiae American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry et al.
[hereinafter AACAP Brief] at 3, Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
.22 See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
123 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry et al.
at 7, Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 9.
126 Id. at 11.
127 Id. at 14, (referring to Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents,
63 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1025 (1992)).
Id. at 15.
129 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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child. To the contrary, a court does far more harm than good when it removes
the child from his or her gay or lesbian parent to "protect" the child from the
possibility of future taunting.'30 Thus, the AACAP Brief concluded the
Bottoms case should be decided without reference to aper se presumption of
parental unfitness because "the presumption is wholly unsupported by social
science research" and "its application undermines the statutory mandate that
custody determination be based on the best interests of the child."''
b. Brief of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers
An amicus curiae brief of the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers 3 2 argued "any presumption that a homosexual parent is 'unfit' for
custody simply by virtue of his or her homosexuality is a doctrine based upon
prejudice and stereotypes which deprives a parent of fundamental rights and
privileges guaranteed under the United States Constitution while
simultaneously ignoring the best interests of the child."' 33 The brief presented
a number of social science studies'34 and judicial decisions'35 to support its
.30 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry et al.
at 21.
a2. Id. at 26. By extending Roe to cases such as Bottoms, it may very well lead to a
decision that would deprive the child of "the person with whom he or she shares the most
important bond in his or her life, with significant negative psychological effects on the child."
Id. at 29.
32 The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers is a national organization of 1,250
matrimonial attorneys from 46 states who specialize in all aspects of family law. Counsel for
this amicus curiae brief included Lawrence D. Diehl, of Hopewell, Virginia, who was then
serving as the Chair of the Family Law Section of the Virginia State Bar; Cynthia L. Greene of
Elser, Greene & Hodor, Miami, Florida; and Melvyn B. Frumkes of Miami, Florida.
33 Brief of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers at 2, Bottoms v. Bottoms,
444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
14 See Robert A. Beargie, Custody Determinations Involving the Homosexual Parent, 22
FAM. L.Q. 71 (1988); Martha Kirkpatrick et al., Lesbian Mothers and Their Children: A
Comparative Study, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 545 (1981); Richard Green, Sexual Identity
of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual or Transsexual Parents, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 692
(1978); Beverly Hoeffer, Children's Acquisition of Sex-Role Behavior in Lesbian-Mother
Families, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 536 (1981); Steve Susoeff, Comment, Assessing
Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody
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attack on the underlying rationale of the per se rule 36 and its argument for the
recognition and application of the better reasoned "nexus" approach.'37
"As is manifestly apparent," argued the brief, the "per se" approach to the
determination of parental fitness in the case of homosexual parents is based
upon presumptions and rationales that have no legitimate basis in either fact
or law. More importantly, however, the "per se" approach as typified by Roe
v. Roe actually ignores the single most overriding consideration in all custody
cases - the best interests of the child. 3  The best interests of the child are
not adequately addressed under the per se rule, the brief argued, because the
per se rule focuses on the parent and not on the child. By determining custody
solely on a presumption of unfitness, the court makes no allowance for a
judicial determination of the actual welfare of the child, especially if the
homosexual parent has the closest relationship to the child as the
"psychological parent."' 39 Moreover, theper se test "fails to address the needs
and welfare of the child because it limits the court's consideration of the
factors involved in child custody cases to: the presumed immorality of the
parent. As such, the myriad elements that should properly comprise a child
custody decision are never addressed."' 40
Standard, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 852 (1985); Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same Sex
Relationships: An Equal Protection Analysis, 102 HARV. L. REv. 617 (1989); Note,
Developments-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1508, 1629 (1989).
' These cases included S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985); Nadler v.
Superior Court, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Braman v. Braman, 602 So. 2d 682
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Bezio v.
Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980); M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1979); In re Jacinta M., 764 P.2d 1327 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988); Guinan v. Guinan, 477
N.Y.S.2d 830 (App. Div. 1984); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); A.
v. A., 514 P.2d 358 (Or. Ct. App. 1973); Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704 (S.C. Ct. App.
1987); Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981); In re Cabalquinto, 718 P.2d 7 (Wash. Ct. App.
1986).
136 See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
,31 See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
13' Brief of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers at 1516, Bottoms v.
Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
9 Id. at 16-17.
140 Id. at 17.
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Consequently, only the "nexus" approach provides a means of protecting
a child in the event that there is a valid basis for concern in a given case...
. A homosexual parent might be found to be unfit for any of the many reasons
that a heterosexual parent might be found unfit or for reasons directly related
to the parent's sexual orientation so long as such valid reasons exist and are
demonstrated to the court.'4 Under the "nexus" test, therefore, the court "can
be assured of having truly served the best interests of the child."'42
The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers' Brief, therefore, argued
Virginia should abandon the per se rule in favor of the better reasoned
"nexus" approach. What the brief did not discuss in more detail, however,
was why the middle ground "presumptive" approach'43 should likewise be
rejected.'"
c. Brief of the National Center for Lesbian Rights, et al. [The NCLR
Brief]
Another formidable amicus curiae brief in support of Sharon Bottoms was
filed on behalf of the National Center for Lesbian Rights, Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Gay and Lesbian Advocates and
Defenders, National Lesbian and Gay Law Association, Bay Area Lawyers for
Individual Freedom, N.O.W. Legal Defense and Education Fund, Women's
Law Project, and Northwest Women's Law Center.'45
141 Id.
142 Id. at 18.
141 See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
'4 For example, the brief recognized that the "various states of the United States have
adopted three approaches to determinations of the fitness of a homosexual parent to the custody
of his or her child", Brief of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers at 2, but then the
brief subsequently ignored the middle ground "presumptive" approach. See Robert A. Beargie,
Custody Determinations Involving the Homosexual Parent, 22 FAM. L.Q. 71, 75-76 (1988).
' Counsel for this brief was Abby Abinanti, Legal Director of the National Center for
Lesbian Rights, and Elizabeth Henderickson, Executive Director of the National Center for
Lesbian Rights, San Francisco. On brief were Paula Ettelbrick, Rachel Bernstein, Paula
Brantner, Catherine Stearne, and Shannon Minter. Local counsel was Pia J. North of
Richmond. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
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The NCLR Brief once again reiterated many of the empirical studies cited
in the Appellant's Brief 46 and the AACAP Brief 47 in arguing the trial court
ignored uncontradicted expert testimony that there is no difference in
psychological development between the children of heterosexual and lesbian
parents, and that children of lesbian mothers are no more likely to become
lesbian or gay than the children of non-lesbian mothers. 48
The NCLR Brief also argued Virginia should adopt the "nexus" approach,
because by following Roe, the trial court chose a standard inconsistent with
the best interests of the child and inconsistent with the national trend
necessitating a nexus between the proscribed activity and any detriment to the
child. 49 Like the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers' Brief,5 ' the
NCLR Brief recognized there are three judicial approaches concerning a
parent's sexual orientation in child custody cases. 5' Yet after identifying the
middle ground "presumptive" test' as well as the per se rule and the "nexus"
approach, the NCLR Brief - like the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers' Brief - basically ignored the middle ground "presumptive"
approach without any further discussion regarding its inherent strengths or
weaknesses.
Like the Appellant's Brief,' the NCLR Brief argued the trial court failed
to apply the strong presumption in favor of leaving custody with a natural
parent - a presumption that could only be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence of parental unfitness. 5 4 Moreover, even if Roe were erroneously
extended to non-parent challenges, the NCLR Brief argued the trial court
i" See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
'4 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
148 NCLR Brief at 25-32, Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
149 Id at 22-27. "Other than Virginia, only four states-Arkansas, Missouri, Oklahoma,
and Kentucky--hold that a parent's sexual orientation conclusively disqualifies him or her from
being a custodial parent in a dispute with a natural parent." Id. at 22.
,so See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
' NCLR Brief at 22.
i52 "Some states hold that a parent's lesbian or gay identity does not preclude custody as
a matter of law, but that it creates a rebuttable presumption against custody." Id. at 22. See also
supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 10 1-03 and accompanying text.
14 NCLR Brief at 2-3.
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judge failed to make a separate determination of which placement would be
in the child's best interests, based upon the facts of each particular case, as
required by Virginia law.'
Finally, the NCLR Brief argued the application of aper se test of parental
unfitness when a parent is a lesbian is not justified by the existence of
Virginia's sodomy statute because the statute is applicable to heterosexuals as
well as homosexuals, because other states with sodomy statutes have not
applied those statutes to intraparental disputes, and since no other state has
applied the statute to a custody dispute between a parent and a nonparent. I '
D. The Decision of the Virginia Court of Appeals
On June 21, 1994, the Virginia Court of Appeals handed down its decision
in Bottoms v. Bottoms.'" The unanimous opinion, written by Judge Sam W.
Coleman III, agreed with Appellant Sharon Bottoms" 8 that Kay Bottoms had
not rebutted the parental presumption in favor of Sharon by clear and
convincing evidence."5 9
Is ld. at 5-6. "The trial court never undertook an analysis of the best interests of the
child. If it had, the only evidence in the record upon which it could have made that requisite
finding is the uncontradicted expert testimony that a parent's sexual orientation is not harmful
to a child. The trial court in the instant case relied without evidence on its own fears regarding
the child's psychological welfare. This is impermissible under Virginia law: Virginia courts
have consistently held that before a parent can lose custody to a nonparent, there must be a
specific finding that parental custody would harm the child."
16 Id. at 11-20. See also supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
's 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
156 See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
's The court wrote:
A child's natural and legal right to the care and support of a parent and the parent's
right to the custody and companionship of the child should only be disrupted if there
are compelling reasons to do so. Bailes v. Sours, 231 Va. 96, 100, 340 S.E.2d 824,
827 (1986). Therefore, in order for a third party, even a grandparent, to be awarded
custody of a child in preference to the child's natural parent, the third party must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit or that special
circumstances give an extraordinary reason for a transfer of custody....
The custody dispute between Sharon and Kay Bottoms is not governed by the
same principles that control a dispute between two parents. When natural parents are
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Regarding the facts of this particular case, involving Sharon's conduct and
Tyler's best interests, the court of appeals stated:
The most that can be said against Sharon Bottoms, insofar as her parenting
is concerned, is that on two occasions she spanked her son "too hard," on
occasion she swore in his presence, she had him stand in a corner, and on
occasion she had failed to change his diaper....
Although Sharon Bottoms' parenting during this three-year period was far
from ideal, she was not indifferent to her child's well-being. Her disciplining
of the child, even if by some standards considered intemperate or
inappropriate, was not abusive. Her lifestyle in moving several times in a
short period, in being unemployed for a time, and in failing to inform her
mother of her whereabouts for a week were not acts of neglect or abuse
sufficient to render her an unfit custodian. At all times, Sharon Bottoms
either cared for the child or assured that proper care was provided for the
child. No evidence suggested that any of Sharon Bottoms' actions resulted
in psychological, emotional, or physical harm to the child or that her actions
constituted neglect or abuse. 160
The Virginia Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that a lesbian
"lifestyle" is one factor to be considered in determining a woman's fitness as
a mother because a parent's behavior and conduct in the presence of the child
"influences and affects the child's values and views as to the type of behavior
contesting for custody of their child, the court balances the equities between the
parents and determines with which parent will the child's best interests be served. See
Roe v. Roe, 228 Va. 722, 723, 324 S.E.2d 691, 691 (1985)....
Unlike parental custody disputes wherein the parents stand on equal legal
footing, however, when a third party attempts to divest custody of a child from a
natural parent, the presumption of parental fitness must be rebutted before a court
may consider whether a third party would be a fit or proper custodian. Wilkerson v.
Wilkerson, 214 Va. 395, 397-98, 200 S.E.2d 581, 583 (1973). Thus, unless a parent,
by his or her conduct or condition, is unfit or is unable and unwilling to provide or
care for a child, a court is not entitled to consider whether a third party might be
better able to care for a child ....
444 S.E.2d at 280.
The court subsequently concluded "[blecause we hold that the presumption favoring
Sharon Bottoms in this case was not rebutted, we do not decide whether the grandmother, Kay
Bottoms, could best provide for the child's needs." 444 S.E.2d at 284.
16 Id.
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and conduct that the child will find acceptable."1 6' Citing the case of Doe v.
Doe 62 as authority, however, the court further stated:
The fact that a parent is homosexual does not per se render a parent unfit to
have custody of his or her child .... Thus, the fact that a mother is a lesbian
and has engaged in illegal sexual acts does not alone justify taking custody
of a child from her and awarding the child to a non-parent....
A parent's private sexual conduct, even if illegal, does not create a
presumption of unfitness .... In order for the state or a third party to take
custody of a child from its natural parent, more is required than simply
showing that a parent has engaged in private, illegal sexual conduct, lacks
ideal parenting skills, or is not meeting society's traditional or conventional
standards of morality. A court will not remove a child from the custody of
a parent, based upon proof that the parent is engaged in private, illegal sexual
conduct or conduct considered by some to be deviant, in the absence of proof
that such behavior or activity poses a substantial threat of harm to a child's
emotional, psychological, or physical well-being. 63
The Virginia Court of Appeals, therefore, rejected the trial court's contention
that, based upon Roe v. Roe, Virginia law applied a per se rule to gay and
lesbian parents in child custody disputes."
161 Id.
162 284 S.E.2d 799, 806 (1981).
163 444 S.E.2d at 281-82. The court cited as authority for this rationale the cases of Doe
v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799, 806 (Va. 1981); Ford v. Ford, 419 S.E.2d 415, 417 (Va. Ct. App.
1992), and Sutherland v. Sutherland, 414 S.E.2d 617, 618 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
'6 See supra notes 26-33, 48-50, 78-83 and accompanying text. The Virginia Court of
Appeals held that the trial court erroneously adopted aper se rule based upon Roe v. Roe for
two reasons:
First, the Roe case does not stand for the proposition that a homosexual
parent is per se unfit to have custody of a child. The Court stated in Roe "[a]lthough
we decline to hold that every lesbian mother or homosexual father is per se an unfit
parent... [this] father's continuous exposure of the child to his immoral and illicit
relationship renders him an unfit and improper custodian as a matter of law."
Second, the Roe decision has little or no application to this case because Roe
involved a dispute between two parents over which was the preferred custodian.
444 S.E.2d at 283 (citations omitted).
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Accordingly, since Kay Bottoms had not proven Sharon Bottoms was an
unfit mother by clear and convincing evidence, 65 and because lesbianism did
not constitute unfitness per se in Virginia under either Roe v. Roe or Doe v.
Doe,"6 the Virginia Court of Appeals concluded "that Sharon Bottoms is not
to be deprived of custody of her son upon the present record. We reverse and
vacate the circuit court's order and remand the case with directions that the
circuit court enter an order effectuating the resumption of custody by the
mother of her son."'67 Predictably, Richard Ryder, attorney for Kay Bottoms,
decided to appeal the Virginia Court of Appeals' decision to the Virginia
Supreme Court.
68
E. The Appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court
1. Kay Bottoms' Petition for Appeal
In her Petition for Appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Kay Bottoms'
attorney, Richard Ryder, argued the court of appeals misinterpreted the
holding of Roe v. Roe, and that Roe presented a "substantial constitutional
question." 69 The decision by the court of appeals in Bottoms, however, made
no explicit reference to any state or federal constitutional issues, and neither
party had previously raised a substantial constitutional issue before the
Henrico County Circuit Court or the Virginia Court of Appeals. 70 Kay
65 See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
'66 See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
167 444 S.E.2d at 284.
168 During the pendency of this final appeal, custody of Tyler remained with his
grandmother, Kay Bottoms.
,69 Kay Bottoms' Petition for Appeal at 1, 6-8, Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va.
1995). Sharon Bottoms' Appellee Brief to the Virginia Supreme Court also incorporated a
constitutional argument:
In addition, constitutional due process requires a showing of actual or imminent harm
before a child may be removed from the custody of his or her parents.
Id. at 13. See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 778 (M.D. Ala. 1976). The United States
Constitution protects parenthood, including the parent's companionship, care, custody, and
management of children, as well as individual choices about child-rearing. See Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1981); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
170 The amicus curiae brief of the National Center for Lesbian Rights, et al. however had
referred to "the constitutional presumption" favoring parents over non-parents. NCLR Brief
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Bottoms' Petition for Appeal also argued the Virginia Supreme Court should
grant an appeal because the Bottoms case involved a matter of first impression
in Virginia "and is of widespread interest in the courts and with the public."''
Finally, the Petition for Appeal argued the best interest of Tyler was to stay
with his grandmother, Kay Bottoms.'
In the Brief in Opposition to a Petition for Appeal filed on behalf of
Sharon Bottoms, her attorneys argued "while it is arguably under [Rule
5:17(c)(2) of the Virginia Supreme Court] that in the present case a decision
by this Court, depending on its scope, could have precedential value, the Court
of Appeals' decision should stand because it reached the correct result by
applying, not varying, the long-established standard for third-party custody
cases."'73 Arguing that the court of appeals' decision should not be disturbed,
Sharon's Opposition Brief went on to state:
The Court of Appeals properly placed this case within existing Virginia
domestic relations law, and did not contravene, overrule or depart from this
Court's precedents as it understood them. Indeed, in requiring the return of
the child in this case to his natural mother absent clear and convincing proof
that she was unfit and that the child's best interest required shifting custody
to a third party, the Court of Appeals reached the only result permissible
under the settled law of this Commonwealth. 74
at 3, Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429 (1984); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). However, Virginia child
custody precedent has not been explicitly based upon any constitutional grounds. See, e.g.,
Mason v. Moon, 385 S.E.2d 242, 246 (Va. Ct. App. 1989); Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824,
826 (Va. 1986).
"' Kay Bottoms Petition for Appeal at I, 6-8, Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va.
Ct. App. 1994).
172 Kay Bottoms' Petition for Appeal at 3-6.
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An appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court from the intermediate Virginia
Court of Appeals in family law matters is not an appeal of right, and such
appeals are seldom granted by the Virginia Supreme Court. Ominously, the
Virginia Supreme Court granted Kay Bottoms' Petition for Appeal.
2. The Supreme Court Appellate Briefs
a. Kay Bottoms'Appellant Brief
Kay Bottoms' Appellant Brief to the Virginia Supreme Court, written by
Mr. Ryder, was again nine pages long and cited five relevant cases. Mr.
Ryder basically ignored all the proffered empirical social science evidence.'75
He likewise ignored the legal controversy concerning whether or not Roe v.
Roe constituted aper se rule 76 and he did not address the burden of proof and
strong presumption in favor of parental custody.'77
Instead, Mr. Ryder primarily argued, based upon the facts of this
particular case, it would be in Tyler's best interests to remain with Kay
Bottoms.' Specifically, Mr. Ryder emphasized Sharon was an "unfit"
mother because she admitted that she and April had "slept in the same bed
while the child's bed was in that room;"'79 that Sharon "lived in four different
homes in a three-year period . . . with a man, with her cousin, with two
lesbians, and then with April; '"'8 that Sharon was unemployed for three years,
"being dependent on other people, including April;''"" that Sharon had
"decided to 'take a chance' with the custody of Tyler and move back into
April's apartment upon the advice of the ACLU;"' 2 that April was discharged
from the Army because of alcoholism and had stopped attending Alcoholics
173 See supra notes 2, 25, and 120-31 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 27-33, 48-50, 105, and 162-64 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 10 1-03, 158-59 and accompanying text.
's Appellant's Brief to the Virginia Supreme Court at 4-7, Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457
S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
119 Id. at 4 (citing to the Trial Court Transcript at 12-13, Bottoms v. Bottoms,
CH93JA0517-00 (Henrico Co., Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 7, 1993).
"'0 Id. at 5-6.
1s id. at 6.
182 Id.
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Anonymous;3 that Sharon had lost her temper with Tyler and hit him on two
occasions "too hard;"' ' that Sharon allegedly admitted to her brother that she
was "not fit to be a mother;"'85 that Sharon "would get the AFDC check and
spend it on having her fingernails done before she would buy food for the
baby;"'' that "Kay took care of Tyler [and] kept Tyler seventy percent (70%)
of the time since he was born;'"87 that Kay "is a nanny who takes care of a
home and two other children and keeps Tyler with her at her place of
employment;' 88 and because, "[o]n a number of occasions, Sharon would
leave Tyler with Kay for a period of time [and] Kay would not know Sharon's
location or telephone number."' 9
Secondarily, Mr. Ryder quoted the Virginia Supreme Court precedent in
both Brown v. Brown' and Roe v. Roe 9 ' holding:
In all custody cases the controlling consideration is always the child's
welfare and, in determining the best interest of the child, the court must
decide by considering all the facts, including what effect a nonmarital
relationship by a parent has on the child. The moral climate in which
children are to be raised is an important consideration for the court in
determining custody and adultery [or lesbianism] is a reflection of a mother's
moral values. An illicit relationship to which minor children are exposed
183 Id.
"9 Id.





'9o 237 S.E.2d 89 (Va. 1977) (involving an indiscreet heterosexual custodial mother
cohabiting in the same household with her lover and her children). But see Ford v. Ford, 419
S.E.2d 415 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) and Sutherland v. Sutherland, 414 S.E.2d 617 (Va. Ct. App.
1992) (both involving discreet cohabitation of the custodial parent and heterosexual lover in the
same household as the children).
191 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985) (involving an indiscreet homosexual father cohabiting with
his lover in the same household as his daughter). See generally supra notes 26-30 and
accompanying text.
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cannot be condoned. Such a relationship must necessarily be given the most
careful consideration in a custody proceeding.'92
Mr. Ryder conceded that Roe "did not say that the parent's conduct
rendered [him or her] an unfit parent."' 9 3 "It was only when the child was
exposed to such conduct that [the parent] became unfit," and the conduct of
Sharon "i.e. hugging and kissing, patting on the bottom, coupled with the oral
sex and Sharon sleeping in the same bed with April... in the residence where
Tyler would live ... renders Sharon an unfit parent."' 94
b. Sharon Bottoms'Appellee Brief
Sharon Bottoms' Appellee Brief to the Virginia Supreme Court'
9 5 re "
emphasized the "unrebutted presumption in favor of parental custody and the
best interests of the child."'" Factually, the brief reiterated that the trial court
testimony established Sharon and April are a "healthy, well-functioning
couple;"'' Sharon is "warm" and "responsive" with her son and Tyler
behaves "as if entirely secure and at ease with his mother, it being a very
familiar and comfortable situation for him;"'98 Tyler is a "bright, self-
confident, socially responsive little boy who is experiencing no undue
emotional discomfort, cognitive deficits, or developmental delays;"'" and
Sharon testified she would cease living with April Wade if "extreme measures
were necessary for her to retain custody of her son."2" Kay had admitted that
192 Appellant's Brief to the Virginia Supreme Court at 7-8, Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457
S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995) (citing Brown v. Brown, 237 S.E.2d 89, 91 (Va. 1977); Roe v. Roe, 324
S.E.2d 691, 693 (Va. 1985)).
193 Id. at 8.
194 Id. at 8-9.
' The brief was submitted by co-counsel Donald K. Butler and Stephen B. Pershing,
with William B. Rubenstein, Ruth E. Harlow, and Marc E. Elovitz of the American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation of counsel.
196 Appellee Brief of Sharon Bottoms to the Virginia Supreme Court at 2, Record No. 94-
1166 (Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995)). See also notes 101-03 and
accompanying text.
197 Id. at 4 (citing to the Trial Court Transcript at 155).
'9' Id. (citipg to the Trial Court Transcript at 9).
99 Id. at 4-5 (citing to the Trial Court Transcript at 9).
200 Id. at 5 (citing to the Trial Court Transcript at 40).
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Sharon had never abused Tyler,2"' and Sharon testified that she had never
engaged in sexual activity in the presence of Tyler, and Kay has never made
any such claim.20 2 Accordingly, the "parental presumption [should not be]
rebutted by [Kay Bottoms'] conclusory allegations2"3 that a parent's conduct
may have an adverse effect on his or her child."2" Thus, the Virginia Court
of Appeals correctly found Kay had not presented sufficient evidence to rebut
Sharon's strong parental presumption by clear and convincing evidence.2 '
Sharon Bottoms' Appellee Brief also argued the Virginia Court of Appeals
properly held that a court's view "as to the morality of a parent's behavior does
not rebut the parental presumption in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence of adverse effect on the child,"2' and as to a parent's homosexuality,
"this Court has specifically held that any possible adverse effects of a parent's
homosexuality cannot be assumed without specific proof,"0 7 and evidence
had been presented in the trial court proceeding that "social science studies
overwhelmingly demonstrate that being raised by a lesbian or gay parent has
no adverse effect on the child."2 '
The brief further argued the Virginia Court of Appeals correctly held that
Roe v. Roe does not apply to a third-party custody dispute,2" and made a
201 Id. at 5 (citing to the Trial Court Transcript at 83, 85).
202 Id. (citing to the Trial Court Transcript at 12, 16).
203 See supra notes 179-89 and accompanying text.
204 Appellee Brief of Sharon Bottoms to the Virginia Supreme Court at 10, Record No.
94-1166 (Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995)) (citing Mason v. Moon, 385 S.E.2d
242, 246 (Va. Ct. App. 1989), which states "[a] parent and child will not be deprived of one
another based on surmise and conjecture.").
20 Id. at 6 (citing Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 284 (Va. Ct. App. 1994)). See
also supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
206 Id. at 12 (citing as authority Brown v. Kittle, 303 S.E.2d 864 (Va. 1983); Phillips v.
Kiraly, 105 S.E.2d 856 (Va. 1958)).
27 Id. at 12 (citing as authority Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981)). See also supra
notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
211 Id. at 6 (citing to the Trial Court Transcript at 112-34). See also supra notes 2, 25,
120 and accompanying text.
209 Id. at 18-19. See also supra note 164.
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final-and not unreasonable-request that to the extent Roe v. Roe suggested
an impermissible and factually unsupported per se rule that lesbian or gay
parents are unfit as a matter of law,2" ° that the Virginia Supreme Court should
clarify or overrule Roe v. Roe.21'
c. Amicus Curiae Appellate Briefs
The amicus curiae briefs submitted to the Virginia Supreme Court on
behalf of Sharon Bottoms restated and reemphasized many of the previous
arguments made to the Virginia Court of Appeals." 2
The amicus curiae brief of the American Academy of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry, the American Psychological Association, the National
Association of Social Workers, the Virginia Chapter of the National
Association of Social Workers, and the Virginia Psychological Association
again argued the social science research "indicates that there are no significant
differences between children raised by lesbian mothers or gay fathers and
those raised by heterosexual parents," ' that the social science research does
not suggest that lesbian mothers and gay fathers are likely to be unfit
parents,2 4 and a natural parent in an openly lesbian or gay relationship is
entitled to the presumption of parental fitness.15
The amicus curiae brief of the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers continued to argue in favor of the better-reasoned "nexus" approach
to gay and lesbian child custody disputes.2 6
The amicus curiae brief of the National Center for Lesbian Rights et al.
made a four-prong argument to the Virginia Supreme Court. First, the NCLR
brief argued the Virginia Court of Appeals correctly concluded the trial court
210 See supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
211 Appellee Brief of Sharon Bottoms to the Virginia Supreme Court at 19-25.
..2 See supra notes 119-56 and accompanying text.
23 Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry,
et al. to the Virginia Supreme Court at 8-17, Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
214 Id. at 20-24.
25 Id. at 25-34. See generally supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text.
26 Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers to the
Virginia Supreme Court at 2-10, Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995). See also
supra notes 132-44 and accompanying text.
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abused its discretion by removing Tyler from the custody of his mother, and
granting custody to the third party grandmother.217 The brief contended the
trial court erred because the trial court failed to apply the strong presumption
of parental fitness under Virginia law which cannot be overcome without a
specific showing that the parent's conduct has caused harm to the child by
clear and convincing evidence."' Second, to the extent it is inconsistent with
an evidence-based nexus approach to the determination of parental unfitness,
Roe v. Roe should be overturned.2"9 Third, social science research
"unanimously shows" children of lesbian and gay parents are not harmed by
their parents' sexual orientation.22 And fourth, Virginia's criminal code
prohibiting sodomy does not justify the application ofaper se test of parental
unfitness where a parent is a lesbian.22" '
Finally, a fourth amicus curiae brief submitted by the Virginia Women
Attorneys Association2" argued the Virginia Supreme Court should not award
custody to a third party in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that
the mother's sexual orientation had an adverse impact on the child;2" the court
should refuse to establish anyper se rules in custody determinations; 224 and
217 Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Center for Lesbian Rights, et al. to the Virginia
Supreme Court at 1-13, Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
211 Id.
219 Id. at 14-17.
220 Id. at 18-27. But see also supra notes 25, 38-40 and accompanying text.
221 Id. at 28-32. See also supra notes 145-56 and accompanying text.
222 Counsel for this amicus curiae brief was Kathleen A. Dooley, Secretary of the Virginia
Women Attorneys Association; and on brief were Renae R. Patrick, Laurie E. Forbes, and L.
Anne Coughenor.
223 Amicus Curiae Brief of the Virginia Women Attorneys Association to the Virginia
Supreme Court at 4-10, Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995) (citing as authority
Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 200 S.E.2d 581 (Va. 1973); Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824 (Va.
1986); Malpass v. Morgan, 192 S.E.2d 794 (Va. 1972)).
224 Id. at 10-13 (citing as persuasive authority the newly enacted VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
124.1 et seq. (Michie 1994), as well as citing Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824 (Va. 1986);
Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 200 S.E.2d 581 (Va. 1973); Ford v. Ford, 419 S.E.2d 415 (Va. Ct.
App. 1992); Sutherland v. Sutherland, 414 S.E.2d 617 (Va. Ct. App. 1992); Brinkley v.
Brinkley, 336 S.E.2d 901 (Va. Ct. App. 1985)).
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aper se rule that homosexuals are unfit for custody would not serve the best
interests of children in the Commonwealth of Virginia.25
Sharon Bottoms thus possessed a formidable array of appellate briefs226
and a well-reasoned unanimous decision from the Virginia Court of Appeals227
in her favor as she faced the Virginia Supreme Court.
F. The Decision of the Virginia Supreme Court
On April 21, 1995, the Virginia Supreme Court handed down its long-
awaited Bottoms v. Bottoms decision. 2  In a controversial 4-3 decision,
Justice A. Christian Compton held the law and the evidence were sufficient
to support the trial court's findings that the presumption in favor of Tyler's
mother, Sharon Bottoms, had been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence
of parental unfitness, and awarding custody to his grandmother, Kay Bottoms,
would serve Tyler's best interests.229
This particular Virginia Supreme Court decision is disturbing, however,
not only for what the court ultimately decided, but also for what the court
ultimately refused to decide. First, the Virginia Supreme Court stated, absent
"clear evidence to the contrary in the record, the judgment of a trial court
comes to the appellate court with a presumption that the law was correctly
applied to the facts' 23 and "these [trial court] findings should not be disturbed
by an appellate court unless they are plainly wrong or without evidence to
support them."231
The Bottoms trial court had interpreted Roe v. Roe as constituting a per se
rule of parental unfitness, 232 whereas the Virginia Court of Appeals and the
25 Id. at 13-17 (citing as authority Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 752-57 (1982);
Weller v. Dept. of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387, 394 (4th Cir. 1990); Bailes v. Sours, 340
S.E.2d 824 (Va. 1986)). "This Court has said that the rights of a natural parent are founded
upon natural justice and wisdom and... essential to the peace, order, virtue and happiness of
society." Id. at 14 (citing Walker v. Brooks, 124 S.E.2d 195, 198 (Va. 1962)).
226 See supra notes 195-225 and accompanying text.
221 See supra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
22B 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995), rev'g, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
229 Id. at 108-09.
230 Id. at 105 (citing Yarbough v. Commonwealth, 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (Va. 1977)).
231 Id. at 105 (citing Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824, 827 (Va. 1986)).
232 See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
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Virginia Supreme Court both expressly held in their respective decisions "a
lesbian mother is not per se an unfit mother." '233 Clearly, the trial court had
not correctly applied the law to the facts, and the trial court decision therefore
was indeed "plainly wrong." Incredibly, the majority opinion chose to ignore
this crucial fact.234
Next, the majority discussed the factual history of the Bottoms
controversy to demonstrate Sharon Bottoms was an "unfit" mother by clear
and convincing evidence.2 35 The majority again basically ignored trial court
testimony that Sharon Bottoms - though far from being an ideal mother -
was a good mother to Tyler and enjoyed a stable relationship with Tyler and
with April Wade.236 The Virginia Supreme Court summarized:
In the present case, the record shows a mother who, although devoted to
her son, refuses to subordinate her own desires and priorities to the child's
welfare. For example, the mother disappears for days without informing the
child's custodian of her whereabouts. She moves her residence from place
to place, relying on others for support, and uses welfare funds to "do" her
fingernails before buying food for the child. She has participated in illicit
relationships with numerous men, acquiring a disease from one, and
"sleeping" with men in the same room where the child's crib was located. To
233 Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 283 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) and 457 S.E.2d at 108
(Va. 1995) (emphasis added). See also supra note 164 and infra note 241.
234 See 457 S.E.2d at 109 (Keenan, J., dissenting).
This court has held, as the majority of states, that a lesbian mother is not per se an
unfit parent. Doe v. Doe, 222 Va. 736, 748, 284 S.E.2d 799, 806 (1981).
Nevertheless, the majority ignores the trial court's refusal to follow this established
law in the Commonwealth.
•.. Thus, I would affirm the Court of Appeals' holding that the trial court
erred in applying a per se rule of parental unfitness based on the mother's
homosexual conduct ....
Id.
235 457 S.E.2d at 105-08. The court stated it would "summarize the facts in the light most
favorable to the grandmother [who prevailed at the trial court level], resolving all conflicts in
the evidence in her favor." Id. at 105.
236 See supra notes 66-67, 197-204 and accompanying text.
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aid in her mobility, the mother keeps the child's suitcase packed so he can be
quickly deposited at the grandmother's.
The mother has difficulty controlling her temper and, out of frustration,
has struck the child when it was merely one year old with such force as to
leave her fingerprints on his person. While in her care, she neglects to
change and cleanse the child so that, when he returns from visitation with
her, he is "red" and "can't even sit down in the bathtub.
Unlike Doe, 222 Va. at 747, 284 S.E.2d at 805, relied on by the mother,
there is proof in this case that the child has been harmed, at this young age,
by the conditions under which he lives when with the mother for any
extended period. For example, he has already demonstrated some disturbing
traits. He uses vile language. He screams, holds his breath until he turns
purple, and becomes emotionally upset when he must go to visit the mother.
He appears confused about efforts at discipline, standing himself in a comer
facing the wall for no apparent reason.237
The court also emphasized the guardian ad litem's recommendation that Kay
Bottoms should have custody of Tyler.23
Although noting the Virginia Court of Appeals had concluded that all this
evidence failed to prove that Sharon Bottoms "abused or neglected her son.
. . or that she is an unfit mother,"239 the majority opinion disagreed. The
majority opinion held the court of appeals failed to give proper deference
upon appellate review to the trial court's factual findings, and misapplied the
law to the facts viewed from a proper appellate perspective. The evidence is
plainly sufficient, when applying the clear and convincing standard and when
viewing the facts from the correct appellate perspective, to support the trial
court's findings that the parental presumption has been rebutted, that the
mother is an unfit custodian at this time, and that the child's best interests
would be promoted by awarding custody to the grandmother. 4
237 457 S.E.2d at 108.
231 "Finally, the recommendation of the guardian ad litem in this case, while not binding
or controlling, should not be disregarded." 457 S.E.2d at 108.
239 Id. at 107. See also supra note 160 and accompanying text.
240 Id. at 107. But see also supra note 234 and accompanying text.
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It is, therefore, clear from these two appellate decisions that reasonable
jurists can - and did - differ regarding what factual background would
constitute parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. Yet in this
particular case, the facts arguably fell far short of demonstrating Sharon
Bottoms was an "unfit" mother based upon clear and convincing evidence of
any alleged child abuse or neglect, and one wonders if the court would have
marshaled its evidence any differently had Sharon Bottoms been a
heterosexual custodial parent."'
Perhaps the most troubling and contradictory part of the Virginia Supreme
Court majority opinion in Bottoms, however, involved the issue of Sharon
Bottoms' lesbianism. On one hand, the court reiterated under Virginia law a
lesbian mother is not per se an unfit parent,242 and thus it impliedly agreed
with the court of appeals that the trial court had misapplied Roe v. Roe as a
per se rule of parental unfitness. 243 But on the other hand, the court then
paradoxically reiterated its support of the "social condemnation" assumptions
made in Roe:
We have previously said that living daily under conditions stemming from
active lesbianism practiced in the home may impose a burden upon a child
by reason of the "social condemnation" attached to such an arrangement,
which will inevitably afflict the child's relationships with its "peers and with
the community at large." We do not retreat from that statement; such a result
is likely under these facts.2"
241 See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text. See also Lesbian Denied Custody,
VIRGINIA LAWYER'S WEEKLY, May 1, 1995, at 23 (reporting a subsequent interview of Sharon
Bottoms' co-counsel, Donald Butler). '"The majority opinion tries to combine other factors with
the lesbian factors and say it amounts to unfitness,"' said Richmond attorney Donald Butler.
"'Even if you accept all [of the court's allegations of neglect] as true, nobody under Virginia law
would lose custody for these things."'
Id.
242 457 S.E.2d at 108.
243 See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
244 457 S.E.2d at 108 (citations omitted). The court also stated "[c]onduct inherent in
lesbianism is punishable as a Class 6 felony" in Virginia and "thus, that conduct is another
important consideration in determining custody." Id. at 108. The court, however, did not go
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Incredibly, the majority opinion totally ignored - and refused to discuss
-the substantial wealth of proffered empirical social science data, much of
it compiled since the 1985 Roe decision, negating this erroneous judicial
misperception.245 If this social science empirical data was unpersuasive to the
majority, then the court should have properly addressed the issue. Instead, the
court blatantly ignored it, and the dissenting opinion written by Justice
Keenan properly took the majority to task for its unsupported assumptions:
As the Court of Appeals properly recognized, "adverse effects of a parent's
homosexuality on a child cannot be assumed without specific proof."
Although there is no evidence in this record showing that the mother's
homosexual conduct is harmful to the child, the majority improperly
presumes that its own perception of societal opinion and the mother's
homosexual conduct are germane to the issue whether the mother is an unfit
parent. Thus, the majority commits the same error as the trial court by
attaching importance to factors not shown by the evidence to have an adverse
effect on the child.246
A number of other commentators have agreed with the dissenting opinion on
this troubling point.247 Justice Keenan continued:
into any detail on how to evaluate such factors. See supra notes 19-22, 156 and accompanying
text.
245 See supra notes 2, 25, 69-71, 106, 119-31, 146-48, 208, 213-15, 220 and
accompanying text.
246 457 S.E.2d at 109 (Keenan, J., dissenting). See also infra notes 253-54 and
accompanying text.
247 See, e.g., Henry J. Reske, Lesbianism at Center of Custody Dispute, 81 A.B.A. J. 28
(July, 1995).
Joy M Feinberg, co-chair of the Custody Committee of the ABA's Family Law
Section, called the ruling 'tragic' and said it ignores evidence that 'there is no
difference between the psychological well-being of those brought up in a
heterosexual or homosexual home.' Feinberg added that a resolution will be brought
before the ABA's House of Delegates in August stating that 'custody and visitation
shall not be denied or restricted on the basis of sexual orientation.' Id.
Lawrence D. Diehl, Chair of the Virginia State Bar Family Law Section, and co-counsel for the
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers' amicus curiae brief in support of Sharon Bottoms
was also quoted as saying: 'The judges have become self-determined experts and the experts
have become meaningless. Who qualified Justice Compton as an expert in this area?' Diehl
asked." Lesbian Denied Custody, VIRGINIA LAWYER'S WEEKLY, May 1, 1995, at 23.
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The majority's award of final judgment is doubly inappropriate under the
holding of McEntire, because approximately 19 months have passed since
the last evidentiary hearing in this case. In McEntire, the trial court had
applied the wrong rule of law, and almost 18 months had passed since the
last evidentiary hearing. This Court held that, based on the passage of that
amount of time, "we are unable at this time properly to determine the issue
of custody from the record before us. Accordingly, we will remand the case
to the circuit court with direction to hold forthwith another hearing...
applying the law in a manner consistent with this opinion." In the present
case, the same disposition is required.""
What test does the Virginia Supreme Court now apply to child custody
disputes involving gay and lesbian parents? Apparently, both the Virginia
Court of Appeals and the Virginia Supreme Court have rejected the per se test
of parental unfitness.249 Yet, the Virginia Supreme Court's confusing
reaffirmation of its unsupported judicial assumptions in Roe v. Roe"' argues
against Virginia's adoption of the "nexus" approach"' in toto. Perhaps
Virginia law recognizes a middle ground "presumptive" approach252 in child
custody disputes involving gay and lesbian parents, perhaps not.2"3 The court
248 457 S.E.2d at 109 (Keenan, J., dissenting).
249 See supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
250 See supra notes 30, 244 and accompanying text.
251 See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
2 See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
253 Assuming arguendo that Virginia would apply the middle ground "presumptive" rule,
the substantial empirical social science data indicating that there is no significant differences
between children raised by homosexual and heterosexual parents would have rebutted such a
presumption. See supra notes 25, 69-71, 119-131, 146-148, 213-215 and accompanying text.
The Virginia Court of Appeals clearly recognized this important fact in its own Bottoms
decision:
The social science evidence showed that a person's sexual orientation does not
strongly correlate with that person's fitness as a parent. No evidence was presented
to refute these studies. No evidence was presented that tended to prove that Sharon
Bottom's living arrangement with April Wade and their lesbian relationship have
harmed or will harm Sharon Bottoms' son.
Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 283-84 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
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was silent as to exactly which approach it was utilizing, and it would have
been extremely helpful if the majority opinion had given greater guidance to
the jurist and had given greater guidance to the academic and practicing
lawyer. Instead of settling a confusing and contradictory area of the law, the
Virginia Supreme Court, in its Bottoms decision, arguably added even more
unnecessary and unwarranted confusion.254
G. Post Appeal Alternatives
On June 9, 1995, the Virginia Supreme Court denied a rehearing motion
made by attorneys for Sharon Bottoms, leaving Sharon and her attorneys, after
their two-year court battle, with two alternatives. First, they could appeal the
decision to the United States Supreme Court, but according to Kent Willis,
Executive Director of the ACLU of Virginia, "The risk is [that] you'll take a
bad court decision in Virginia and make it national policy. ' 255 Moreover,
Marc E. Elovitz, staff counsel for the ACLU's National Lesbian and Gay
Rights Project in New York, notes that the U.S. Supreme Court has never
ruled on the parental fitness of homosexual parents, and "the likelihood of the
Supreme Court granting a review in any case is low." 6 A final problem with
any constitutional review is that neither the Virginia Court of Appeals nor the
Virginia Supreme Court expressly based either decision on constitutional
grounds.257
A second and more realistic alternative would be to argue the existence
of a change of circumstances affecting Tyler's best interests, because child
custody decisions are generally modifiable if in the child's best interests.258
According to one of Sharon Bottoms' attorneys, Player Michelsen:
254 The Virginia Supreme Court, however, maintained "[n]o novel questions of law are
involved; the legal principles applicable under these circumstances to child custody cases are
settled in the Commonwealth." 457 S.E.2d at 104. The authors, based on their analysis of
Bottoms v. Bottoms, respectfully disagree.
255 Deborah Kelly, Bottoms, ACLU Ponder Move, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 12,
1995, at B 1.
256 Id. at 133.
257 See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
25 See generally GREGORY, supra note 13, at 399-401; SWISHER, supra note 13, at § 15-9
(1991). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 et seq. (Michie, 1994); Keel v. Keel, 303 S.E.2d
917 (Va. 1983); Turner v. Turner, 348 S.E.2d 21 (Va. Ct. App. 1986).
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If the [Virginia] Supreme Court didn't make its ruling based on
homosexuality, then every other reason cited doesn't exist anymore, or has
been remedied by time ... Sharon doesn't hit Tyler anymore. She has lived
in the same house with the same person for two years. They're more
financially stable ... and Sharon is working now as a part-time department
store cashier. The only thing that is still a fact is Sharon is in a lesbian
relationship and is living with her lover. So, if that was not the court's basis
for its ruling, she ought to be able to go back to court and get her son back2"9
Neither Kay Bottoms, nor her lawyer, Richard Ryder, could be reached for
comment,"W and to date, additional legal proceedings filed on behalf of
Sharon Bottoms have not affected the outcome. Tyler lives with his
grandmother, Kay Bottoms, in rural Spotsylvania County, Virginia. He is
now five years old.
IV. CONCLUSION
Bottoms v. Bottoms was a high profile child custody dispute that gained
national and international attention. It presented the Virginia Supreme Court
with an excellent opportunity to clarify two contradictory judicial precedents
involving child custody rights of gay and lesbian parents in Virginia.
The Bottoms case basically involved two interrelated issues. First, did
Virginia adopt a "nexus" test, requiring more proof of actual harm to a child
before removing a child from the custody of a gay or lesbian parent-as
suggested by the 1981 Virginia Supreme Court case of Doe v. Doe? Or did
Virginia recognize a per se "unfitness" test applied to gay and lesbian
parents-as suggested by the 1985 Virginia Supreme Court case of Roe v. Roe
-or perhaps a middle ground "presumptive" test of parental unfitness?
Second, what factual evidence-if any-constituted parental unfitness by
clear and convincing evidence in a custody dispute between a lesbian mother
and a third-party heterosexual grandmother?
... See Kelly, supra note 256, at B3. See Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 107 (where the Virginia
Supreme Court held that Sharon Bottoms "was an unfit mother at this time" (emphasis added)).
See also supra note 248 and accompanying text.
260 Kelly, supra note 256, at B3.
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Since the Doe and Roe cases, a substantial number of recent empirical
studies in social science research indicate there are no significant differences
between children raised by homosexual parents and heterosexual parents, and,
therefore, a natural parent in an openly gay or lesbian relationship should be
entitled to the presumption of parental fitness. This empirical social science
research largely negated previous judicial misperceptions found in
jurisdictions following a per se or middle ground "presumptive" test of
parental unfitness, and these recent empirical studies were ably argued at
Sharon Bottoms' trial, in her two appellate briefs, and in a number of amicus
curiae appellate briefs as well.
Nevertheless, the Virginia Supreme Court, in a controversial 4-3 decision,
flatly ignored these empirical studies. Although purportedly refusing to
recognize a per se parental unfitness rule in Virginia according to the Doe
case, the Virginia Supreme Court paradoxically reaffirmed its unsupported
judicial assumption in Roe that "active lesbianism in the home may impose
a burden upon a child by reason of the 'social condemnation' attached to such
an arrangement."26' As the court's minority opinion correctly observed, "the
majority improperly presumes that its own perception of societal opinion and
the mother's homosexual conduct are germane to the issue of whether the
mother is an unfit parent. '262 Accordingly, child custody law in Virginia
arguably is more unsettled today than prior to the Bottoms decision.
Moreover, in determining whether or not Sharon Bottoms was an unfit
parent by clear and convincing evidence, the Virginia Supreme Court refused
to remand the case back to the trial court-even though nineteen months had
transpired since the initial custody dispute, even though the factual
circumstances of the case had materially changed, and even though the trial
court judge had erred as a matter of law in applying aper se rule of parental
unfitness to Sharon Bottoms at the trial court level.
The Virginia Supreme Court decision in Bottoms v. Bottoms, therefore,
serves as an important example for subsequent state courts-including
26 Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 108.
262 Id. at 109.
[Vol. 34
HeinOnline  -- 34 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 894 1995-1996
CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTE
subsequent Virginia courts-of how not to decide a child custody dispute
involving a gay or lesbian parent.2 63
263 On February 27, 1996, Sharon Bottoms failed in her second attempt to regain custody
of her son Tyler. See Deborah Kelly, Lesbian May End Bid for Son, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, February 28, 1996, at Al. During the last week of August 1996, Sharon Bottoms
and her attorneys regretfully decided not to appeal Judge Boice's most recent custody decision
in favor of Kay Bottoms, and concentrate instead on acquiring more liberal visitation rights for
Sharon Bottoms. To date, Kay Bottoms still retains custody of young Tyler.
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